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In the early summer of 1999, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals issued an important decision concerning gender-based
persecution as a basis for seeking asylum in the United States.
The decision in Abankwah v. INS 1 is sandwiched between a
©2000 Pamela Goldberg. All Rights Reserved.
Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. The
author thanks Elizabeth Higgins and Peggy Collen for their excellent research
assistance, and Anne Pilsbury, Mark Kenmore, and Jon Rauchway for sharing
parts of the records in the three circuit court cases discussed herein. The full
records of the cases in Melgar de Torres v. Reno and Abankwah v. INS were
obtained through the Second Circuit Court of Appeals record office at Foley
Square, New York, New York and are also on file with the author. The full record
of the case in Gomez v. INS is now in archives in Kansas and can be obtained
through the Second Circuit Court of Appeals record room; the author does not
have the full record of the Gomez case.
' 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999). A discussion about the meaning of the term
"gender-based" or "gender-related" persecution can be found infra at Part III. As
this article went to press, three developments related to the issues and themes
discussed herein occurred. First, the Department of Justice issued proposed regula-
tions that would amend the existing asylum law regulations. Among the changes
proposed are inclusion of important case law factors in determining what consti-
tutes a particular social group, including expressly recognizing that gender could
be a determinative factor. See 65 Fed. Reg. 75,688 (Dec. 7, 2000). Second, follow-
ing the publication of these proposed regulations, Attorney General Janet Reno
vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "Board") decision in In re R-A-,
Interim Decision 3403 (BIA 1999), and remanded the case for the Board to recon-
sider once the proposed regulations become final. See In re Matter of Rodi
Alvarado Rena, Order No. 2379-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001). In that case, the Board de-
nied a claim based on severe domestic violence by finding, inter alia, that the
applicant had failed to establish that the harm was on account of her political
opinion or membership in a particular social group. Third, the Washington Post
published an article asserting that Adelaide Abankwah, whose claim is discussed
extensively in this Article, committed fraud in her asylum application, based on
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much earlier case, Gomez v. INS,2 where the Second Circuit
first addressed gender issues in the asylum law context, and
another 1999 decision, Melgar de Torres v. Reno,' which fol-
lowed closely on the heels of Abankwah. These three deci-
sions-the only ones in the Second Circuit explicitly grappling
with gender issues in asylum law-provide an opportunity to
examine the court's approach to gender-based persecution over
the past decade.
In these three decisions, the court had to confront the
issues of rape and sexual assault,4 forced marriage, and forced
female genital mutilation ("FGM").5 Since the court issued its
first decision grappling with an asylum claim based on repeat-
ed rapes and assaults, both rape and FGM have been recog-
nized internationally as grave human rights violations. FGM is
considered by some to represent a hallmark of gender-based
persecution,6 while rape is viewed as an egregious violation of
the Immigration & Naturalization Service (the "INS") investigation and separate
investigation by the Washington Post. See William Branigin & Douglas Farah,
Asylum Seeker is Imposter, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 20, 2000, at Al. Although this
account is troubling, it does not detract from the importance of the decision in
Abankwah, 185 F.3d 18, as a matter of law worthy of scrutiny and analysis, nor
does it support the view that the Second Circuit was wrong to rule as it did.
First, the only charge that seems clearly supported is that Adelaide
Abankwah is not her real name. Branigin & Farah, supra, at Al. The other issues
raised in the article, such as the chief of her tribe denying that they are looking
for her or that they do or would forcibly practice FGM against members of the
tribe, are unsupported and, in some cases, self-serving on the part of the party
who made them. In Abankwah, favorable credibility findings were made.
Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 21. The court of appeals must base its review on the
record it is supplied with. There is nothing in this new information that would
have compelled the court to rule other than it did based on the facts and the
record before it. Perhaps most importantly, however, is that the asylum law pro-
cess is rigorous and difficult and, even so, there are occasions when people get
through it who might not have been eligible. Of greater concern for many is the
unknown number of people who faced real harm in their home country and who
were denied asylum or were turned back without having had the opportunity to
request asylum in this country. See generally KAREN MUSALO ET AL., CENTER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS
COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY: REPORT OF THE FIRST
THREE YEARS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL (May 2000).
2 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
3 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999).
" Gomez, 947 F.2d at 662; Melgar, 191 F.3d at 312.
' Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 20. FGM is also referred to as female circumcision
or female genital surgery, depending on how one views the practice-any of this
terminology might be used to describe the practice from which Abankwah fled. In
Abankwah, the practice is consistently referred to as FGM. Id.
' See generally In re Fauziya Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 13, 1996);
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women's human rights, and, in some contexts, as a violation of
humanitarian law.7 The Second Circuit does not treat these
violations equally, nor does it employ the same analytical ap-
proach in the different cases. An examination of these three
decisions, rendered over an eight year period, reveals that
although the court's understanding of gender-based harm has
evolved on a certain level, in other important regards, it does
not seem to have changed, or at least not enough. The Second
Circuit's uneven approach to gender-based asylum claims rais-
es a number of questions and concerns: What led the Second
Circuit to view the issues raised in the Abankwah case differ-
ently from those raised in Gomez and Melgar? Why did the
Melgar court, rendering its decision eight years after Gomez
and only weeks after Abankwah, employ an approach more
similar to that taken in Gomez than in Abankwah? Can the
different findings in these three cases be reconciled? What can
be learned about the understanding and meaning of gender-
based harm in the asylum law context from a comparison of
these three decisions? This Article will explore these issues.
Unlike the appeals in Gomez and Melgar, the appeal in
Abankwah was sustained and the case remanded to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (the "Board")8 for reconsideration in
light of the court's rulings.9 Yet the Abankwah court defined
its role as the reviewing body in the most circumscribed
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Con-
sequences, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 9(a), at sec. III.B.1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998); NAHID TOUBIA,
FEMALE GENITAL MUTLATION: A CALL FOR GLOBAL ACTION (1993).
' See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to
Centuries of Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L, & POL'Y SYMP. 87, 94 (1999); see also infra
notes 40 & 86. For a recent discussion of rape as a form of persecution in the
asylum law context, see Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1096-98 (9th
Cir. 2000).
' The Board is the administrative body charged with, inter alia, reviewing the
determinations of immigration judges in administrative hearings as to whether to
grant or deny a request for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(9) (2000).
' Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 26. The Board, in turn, granted Abankwah's claim in
a per curiam decision. Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999), rev'd per
curiam, In re Abankwah, A# 74-881-776 (BIA 1999). Just prior to this decision,
the INS agreed to release her from detention where she had been languishing for
two and a half years. See Federal Court Update: Summaries of Recent Immigration
Decisions: Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1328,
1328 (Sept. 3, 1999).
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terms." Although the court did grapple with significant issues
of gender-based persecution," upon closer scrutiny, however,
the decision, perhaps more so than the decisions in Gomez and
Melgar,2 rests specifically on the court's interpretation of the
standard of review and the measure of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support overturning an administrative decision. 3
Because all three cases raise the issue of gender-related harm,
it is important to discern what distinguishes the claim in
Abankwah from the claims in Gomez and Melgar.4 To inter-
pret the Second Circuit's views on gender in the asylum law
context, it is essential to have an understanding of the similar-
ities and the distinctions between these three decisions, the
underlying claims, and the issues raised on appeal. Through a
comparative analysis of these cases, it may be possible to gain
some insight into the court's recognition and understanding of
gender-based persecution. This insight may, in turn, be useful
in considering ways to frame such claims that may be heard by
the Second Circuit in the future. Moreover, this analysis may
also contribute to the development of a more contextual ap-
proach to assessing gender-based persecution in asylum law."
10 Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 22-23.
1 This case raises female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and forced par-
ticipation in tribal ritual as significant aspects of the factual basis for the asylum
request. Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 20-21; see also infra text accompanying notes 54-
61.
12 Both Melgar and Gomez involve occurrences of violent rape and sexual as-
sault against the asylum applicant. Melgar, 191 F.3d at 312; Gomez, 947 F.2d at
662. Gomez frames the rape as an essential aspect of her claim, see Gomez, 947
F.2d at 662, 663, while Melgar, by comparison, shifts the focus away from the
rape and onto other factual allegations. Melgar, 191 F.3d at 309-11. For a full dis-
cussion of the facts in each of these cases, see infra notes 54-61, 103-106, 112-113
and accompanying text.
13 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2000). For a thoughtful, if brief, discussion of the
standard of review in asylum cases, see KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 859-67 (1997).
14 In the asylum law context, decisions are highly fact-specific. Nevertheless, at
the level of the circuit court of appeals, where the court is bound by the record
below, the focus of the inquiry is on matters of law and, where appropriate, on
appropriate exercise of discretion. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
1 In addition to a number of decisions rendered in a variety of circuit courts
over the past decade, there have also been a handful of decisions rendered by the
Board, over this same time period, that specifically address gender in the asylum
law context. See In re S-A-, Interim Decision 3433 (BIA 2000); In re R-A-, Interim
Decision 3403 (BIA 1999); In re Fauziya Kasinga, Interim Decision 3278 (BIA
1996); In re D-V-, Interim Decision 3252 (BIA 1993).
[Vol. 66: 2
GENDER IN THE ASYLUM LAW CONTEXT
Part I of this Article briefly explains the eligibility require-
ments for asylum, the administrative and court procedures for
seeking such relief, the standard of review, and other issues
related to a petition for review to the Second Circuit. Part II
discusses the importance of gender in the asylum law context,
providing some background and locating gender issues in cur-
rent human rights and refugee law discourse. Part II also
provides a definition of some key terms. Part III examines the
three Second Circuit decisions: Gomez,"6  Melgar," and
Abankwah.8 Part III also provides background information
on the legal and political climate surrounding the Gomez deci-
sion, which was rendered over nine years ago. Part IV is a
comparative analysis of the three cases, placing the decisions
in context and assessing the future implications of the treat-
ment of asylum cases that raise gender-related concerns as the
sole or principal basis for the claim.
I. UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
Twenty years ago, the U.S. Congress passed the Refugee
Act of 1980 (the "Refugee Act" or the "Act"). 9 With the pas-
sage of this Act, Congress legislated U.S. compliance with the
treaty obligations it had undertaken twelve years previously.
In 1968, the United States ratified the 1967 Protocol to the
International Convention relating to the Status of Refugees"
16 947 F.2d 660.
17 191 F.3d 307.
18 185 F.3d 18.
19 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 103 (1980). The provisions of the Refugee Act
governing the law of asylum are incorporated into the current Immigration & Na-
tionality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (rewritten in its entirety by Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18
U.S.C.).
" United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter "Protocol"]. The Protocol incorporated
through reference the entire 1951 Convention with two exceptions. The purpose of
the Protocol was to eliminate both the geographical and temporal restrictions con-
tained in the 1951 Convention. The Convention, promulgated as an early order of
business of the then newly formed United Nations, was originally drafted to ad-
dress the issue of refugees in the aftermath of World War II and, as such, it con-
tained specific references to the time frame and location of those refugees. Since
1967, those limitations have been extracted from the refugee definition, and most
nation states that ratified the Convention have since ratified the 1967 Protocol.
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and, through incorporation by reference, the 1951 Convention
itself.2' The Refugee Act adopted virtually verbatim the refu-
gee definition contained in the 1967 Protocol, 2 stating, in rel-
evant part, that a refugee is:
[Amny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of perse-
cution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion.'
Under the Refugee Act, an individual must establish that
she satisfies this definition of a refugee to qualify for asylum
protection in the United States.24 A number of the compo-
nents of this statutory definition have been interpreted over
the years, some even reaching the U.S. Supreme Court. For
example, the Court has interpreted the quantum of proof nec-
essary to establish the "well-founded fear" component of the
refugee standard to require a "reasonable possibility" of
harm. Insofar as the degree of risk of future harm can be
Some states, notably the United States, never did ratify the Convention itself, but
by ratifying the 1967 Protocol, they became bound by the entire Convention as
modified. For a discussion of the history and meaning of the Refugee Convention
and Protocol, see generally GUY S. GOODWIN-GIL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1996); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW vols. 1 & 2 (1984); JAMEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STA-
TUS (1991).
21 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter "Refugee Convention"].
22 That definition was modified by the Protocol from the original 1951 defini-
tion. See supra note 21. By the time of the Protocol in 1967, it was widely recog-
nized that the need for refugee protection existed beyond the parameters of those
World War II refugees, and the geographic and temporal restrictions were lifted.
See supra note 21.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000). In 1996, the refugee definition of persecution
on account of political opinion was amended to explicitly state resistance to subju-
gation to certain coercive population controls, such as forced abortion or forced
sterilization, as a political opinion for purposes of asylum law. Id.
24 U.S. law also recognizes refugees abroad, under separate statutory provisions
and with a distinct process. Id. § 1157. A discussion of the distinctions between
obtaining refugee status abroad and seeking asylum in the United States is be-
yond the scope of this Article. See MUSALO, supra note 14, at 69-84.
2 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407, 424-25 (1984)).
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numerically measured, one need only establish a "one in ten"
chance of suffering persecution.26 The Court has also inter-
preted the meaning of the requirement that the persecution be
"on account of' one of the five enumerated grounds, ruling that
it calls for a showing, by either direct or circumstantial evi-
dence, that the persecutor's motive for harming the victim is
connected to one of those statutory grounds. Other aspects
of the definition that have been interpreted by the circuit
courts28 include, among others, the meaning of persecution,29
2 Id. ("There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for conclud-
ing that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or
otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no 'well-founded fear' of the event hap-
pening") (citation omitted). Prior to this decision, the Court had ruled that the
relief of what was then known as withholding of deportation (with the 1996
amendments, now termed withholding of removal), where the standard calls for a
showing that the individual's "life or freedom would be in danger," required a
showing of a clear probability of harm or that it was "more likely than not" to
occur. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984). A full discussion of the differences
and similarities of this remedy with that of asylum is beyond the scope of this
Article.
' See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). Most recently, in INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court interpreted whether certain conduct alleged to be politi-
cal constituted a "serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States," one of the
potential bars to what was, at the time the claim was first presented, withholding
of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). 526 U.S. 415, 432 (1999) (holding that
Aguirre-Aguirre's participation in organized trafficking stoppages, including, inter
alia, rounding passengers off buses and then setting fire to the buses in protest
against the Guatemalan government, did not constitute political activity but rather
serious nonpolitical crimes statutorily barring Aguirre-Aguirre from eligibility to
withholding of deportation); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii).
While the meaning and application of virtually every component of the statu-
tory definition of a refugee has been subject to judicial interpretation, with the
most common thread being that these interpretations must be developed on a
case-by-case basis, see Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 444, in recent years, the de-
bate on asylum protection has focused on establishing the nexus or 'on account of'
basis. For a critique of the focus of the asylum law inquiry on establishing a "nex-
us" and the Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias, see generally DEBORAH E. ANKER,
LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (3rd ed. 1999); Karen Musalo, Irreconcil-
able Differences?: Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179 (1994).
2 Before reaching a federal court, an asylum claim must first be adjudicated
by the appropriate agency, which, in some instances, begins with the INS and
then moves to the Immigration Court-the local branch of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (the "EOIR"). 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2001). The EOIR is not part of
the INS but rather belongs to a separate and distinct agency. Both the INS and
the EOIR fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and, hence, the
Attorney General. In other cases, the process begins with a filing in the local
immigration court directly. Id. From there, an appeal of a decision by an immigra-
tion judge (the "IJ"), whether a grant or a denial, must be reviewed by the Board,
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political opinion," and membership in a particular social
group.
31
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 (the "1996 IIRIRA") 2 substantially altered
the general framework for U.S. immigration law. Among the
many changes, the amendments included provisions that spe-
the administrative reviewing body, established by regulation. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0, 3.1.
The Board is also part of the EOIR. Only after all administrative levels have been
exhausted will a request for asylum be subject to review in federal court. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(a)(1) (2000) (requiring that an order of removal must be final in order to
seek judicial review); id. § 1252(a)(2)(B). By statute, an appeal of an asylum claim
decision, whether brought by the applicant or the government, does not lodge in
federal district court but must be filed directly with the circuit court of appeals in
the appropriate jurisdiction as a Petition for Review. Id. § 1252(b)(2); see also
infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of review by the
circuit court of appeals). For a detailed presentation of the administrative and
judicial procedures for presenting and appealing a request for asylum, see ANKER,
supra note 28, at 525-70.
29 See, e.g., Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (defining
persecution as "oppression which is inflicted on groups or individuals because of a
difference [between the persecutor's views or status and that of the victim] that
the persecutor will not tolerate").
"0 See, e.g., Carranza-Hernandez v. INS, 12 F.3d 4, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1993) (find-
ing that warning by government official or arrest warrant issued against
Carranza-Hernandez for membership in union and political organizations, coupled
with harassment of other union leaders by the government, were sufficient to
establish well-founded fear of persecution); see also Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017,
1029 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that persecution arising out of union involvement is
harm on account of political opinion and not merely a question of economics);
Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that participa-
tion in a municipal governing body can constitute expression of political opinion).
"1 See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a " 'particular social group' is one united by a voluntary association,
including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamen-
tal to the identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or
should not be required to change it") (citations omitted). Hernandez-Montiel over-
turned Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986), insofar as Sanchez-
Trujillo could have been interpreted to mean that a particular social group neces-
sarily required a "voluntary associational relationship." 801 F.2d at 1576.
32 Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). Many scholars and other commentators have been
highly critical of the changes in immigration brought about by the 1996 IIRIRA.
For some recent critiques of various provisions of the 1996 IIRIRA, see generally
Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); Gerald L.
Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000); Leti Volpp, Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief A
Response to Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 385 (2000).
[Vol. 66: 2
GENDER IN THE ASYLUM LAW CONTEXT
cifically delineated the standard and scope of judicial review of
final orders of removal based on denial of relief. Under the
1996 IIRIRA, the standard for review now requires, inter alia,
that "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary."33 This standard, while subject to case-by-case
application, seems especially harsh when viewed in light of the
humanitarian purpose of asylum law to provide protection
from harm or infringement of fundamental human rights,
torture, or death to those individuals seeking refuge. Neverthe-
less, as with so much of immigration law, this provision does
leave room for interpretation and has led to different results
under not altogether dissimilar circumstances, depending on
the facts of the case and the composition of the reviewing
court.
In Abankwah, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the ability of
appellate courts to review and reverse erroneous or misguided
decisions by the Board. This authority of the circuit courts to
reverse an administrative decision is critical, particularly in
asylum law, where a denial of the claim could leave the appli-
cant vulnerable to forced return to a country where she faces
life-threatening danger, serious harm, or violations of her hu-
man rights. Abankwah is not the only Second Circuit decision
to recognize this principle;34 however, it is the only case to af-
firm this principle in the context of reversing the denial by the
Board of an asylum claim raising gender-based persecution.
II. GENDER IN ASYLUM LAW
Over the last decade, issues related to gender-based perse-
cution and human rights violations of women have gained
increasing visibility.35  First raised by community-based
33 8 U.S.C. § 242(b)(4)(B) (2000). As in the pre-1996 law, this standard has
been construed to mean that the circuit court must examine the record to deter-
mine whether the conclusions reached by the agency are supported by substantial
evidence. Of course, in matters of interpretation of the law, the circuit court may
review the claim de novo.
a' See, e.g., Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1022; Sotelo-Aquije, 17 F.3d at 35.
s For a discussion of the meaning of the terms "gender" and "gender-based" or
"gender-related" harm, see Pamela Goldberg & Bernadette Passade Cisse, Gender
Issues in Asylum Law After Matter of R-A-, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGs 1, 1-2 (Feb. 2000).
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groups and other non-governmental organizations," gender
issues have become a central theme in refugee discourse
among scholars37 and governments. This interest increased
as the realization spread that many human rights violations
faced by women had traditionally been discounted, if not out-
right ignored, by human rights law, humanitarian law, and the
world in general." The significance of gender in human rights
law generally, and in refugee and asylum law in particular,
continues to be discussed and debated.4 °
" For a discussion of the events that occurred at the 1993 United Nations
World Conference on Human Rights that first catapulted the issue of women and
human rights into the public limelight, see generally Julie Mertus & Pamela
Goldberg, A Perspective on Women and International Human Rights After the Vien-
na Declaration: The Inside/Outside Construct, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201
(Winter 1994). For a discussion of the impact of these changes on human rights
and asylum law, see generally Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law and Gender-based
Persecution Claims, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS (Sept. 1994).
"' For example, many casebooks and treatises on immigration law and on asy-
lum and refugee law include a section on gender-related persecution in the asylum
context. See, e.g., THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITI-
ZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 1122-41 (4th ed. 1998); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 252-66 (3d ed. 1999); RICHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMI-
GRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 314-66 (3d ed. 2000); GuY
S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 255-57, 359-65 (2d ed.
1996); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 816-44
(2d ed. 1997); MUSALO ET AL., supra note 14, at 599-728.
"B Gender-related concerns in the refugee and asylum law context were being
raised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the
"UNHCR") as early as 1985 when it issued its first Executive Conclusion on refu-
gee women. Refugee Women and International Protection, Conclusion No. 39
(XXXVI), U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc.
HRC/IP/2/Rev.1986 (1985). In that Conclusion, the UNHCR provided that states
may recognize gender-based persecution claims of women seeking refugee status
under the particular social group category. A similar resolution had been adopted
by the European Parliament in 1984. The UNHCR is the United Nations body
that oversees international refugee protection, with the exception of Palestinian
refugees, whose protection oversight is under the rubric of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency.
" For example, it was only after great public outcry against the forced impreg-
nation of women held in camps for that purpose in the former Yugoslavia that
rape became recognized as a crime of war and against humanity. See, e.g., infra
note 86; see also generally THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE
(1998). The fact that a catalyst for finally gaining recognition of the atrocious na-
ture of the harm occurred when it was perpetrated against white, Eastern Europe-
an women leaves room for comment and concern. Nevertheless, this marks a sig-
nificant advancement in the recognition and protection of women in the context of
international human rights and humanitarian law.
" For example, formulating the rules governing the International Criminal
Court (which has yet to be established due in large part to resistance by the
[Vol. 66: 2
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A crucial turning point connecting women's rights with
international human rights occurred at the 1993 United Na-
tions World Conference on Human Rights (the "Vienna Confer-
ence"). Here, the gendered dimension of human rights viola-
tions committed against women first came into public view on
an international scale.4' The Vienna Conference shed bright
light on issues pertaining to women and human rights and the"
importance of employing a gendered lens in examining these
concerns. A significant part of this discourse concerned making
the links between human rights violations and women seeking
asylum or refugee status.4"
Several years before the Vienna Conference launched
women's human rights into the international discourse, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the
"UNHCR") issued GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF REFu-
GEE WOMEN (the "UNHCR GUIDELINES"). These guidelines
largely address issues of concern to refugee women located in
refugee camps; however, there is a short section on adjudicat-
ing claims for official refugee status. In that section, the
UNHCR raises the notion that claims made by women assert-
ing persecution for resistance to restrictive social norms can be
assessed as persecution on account of membership in a particu-
lar social group."
United States), including gender and harms targeted at women, proved to be an
arduous battle. See generally Jelena Pejic, The International Criminal Court: An
Appraisal of the Roma Package, 34 INT'L L. 65 (Spring 2000).
41 See generally Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. HCR, 44th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993). For a full discussion of the Vienna Confer-
ence and its implications for women's human rights, see generally Mertus &
Goldberg, supra note 37.
42 See generally Family Violence Prevention Fund, Women on the Move: Pro-
ceedings of the Workshop On Human Rights Abuses Against Immigrant and Refu-
gee Women (Vienna, Austria June 18, 1993). This characterization is not entirely
accurate. The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights was convened in June
1993. Canada promulgated the first guidelines for adjudicators of asylum claims
brought by women in March 1993. See generally CANADIAN IMIIGRATION AND REF-
UGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION
65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-
RELATED PERSECUTION (1993), updated in CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
BOARD, WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEAR GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION: UPDATE
(1996). The U!NHCR promulgated guidelines in 1991. See supra note 39 and ac-
companying text; see also infra Part III.
13 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOMEN (1991).
" Id. at 11 54-61.
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In the intervening years since the UNHCR issued its 1989
UNHCR GUIDELINES, the UNHCR, as well as other United
Nations bodies, have issued a variety of documents that ad-
dress the particular protection needs of refugee women.45 In
addition, a number of states have issued their own guidelines
for adjudicating refugee or asylum claims raising gender-re-
lated issues.46 The 1993 WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEAR-
ING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION guidelines (the "Canadian
Guidelines")47 were the first to be issued by a state. The Ca-
nadian Guidelines, still the most comprehensive issued on this
subject, set the standard for countries concerned with fairly
and appropriately adjudicating claims for protection brought by
refugee women. The United States followed Canada in this
trend by issuing its own Considerations for Asylum Officers
Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women memorandum in
1995. 48
" See generally UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REFUGEES: GUIDELINES ON PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
(1995); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, REPORT OF THE SPE-
CIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES,
MS. RADKHIKA COOMARASWAMY, SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION 1997/44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998); U.N.D.A.W.,
Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Gender-based Persecution, Nov. 9-12, 1997,
EGM/GBP/1997/Report.
"' See, e.g., Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, to
All INS Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators, Considerations for Asylum
Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women 2 (May 26, 1995) [hereinafter
U.S. Considerations]; see generally AUSTRALIA DEP'T OF IMMIGR. & MULTICULTURAL
AFFAIRS, REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN VISA APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON GENDER
ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS (1996). For a compilation of some of the guidelines
and some of the leading cases addressing gender issues from the United States,
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and New Zealand, see generally
GENDER ASYLUM LAW IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES: DECISIONS AND GUIDELINES vol. 1
(Refugee Law Center, Inc. ed., 1st ed. 1999) [hereinafter REFUGEE LAW CENTER
COMPILATION]. For an excellent website that contains a number of decisions, gen-
der guidelines, and other information and links concerning gender issues in the
asylum process, see University of California Hastings College of the Law Center
for Gender and Refugee Studies, at http://www.uchastings.law.edu/cgrs (last visited
Feb. 16, 2001).
41 CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE
CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REF-
UGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (1993), updated in CANA-
DIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEAR GEN-
DER-RELATED PERSECUTION: UPDATE GUIDELINE 4 (1996). The Canadian Guidelines
preceded the Vienna Conference by several months.
48 See generally U.S. Considerations, supra note 47.
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Since the time gender was first recognized as a concern in
asylum adjudication, there has been a range of decisions, both
in the United States and abroad, examining the breadth, scope,
and limits of such claims.49 The Second Circuit has addressed
claims involving gender-based persecution on only three occa-
sions. The Abankwah case is the second of these, and it re-
ceived wide-spread support and publicity." To fully appreciate
the decision in Abankwah, it is useful to place it in the context
of the two other decisions.
III. SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON GENDER-BASED ASYLUM
Gomez"1 represents the first Second Circuit decision
where gender was explicitly surfaced as a central component of
an asylum claim. Decided eight years before Abankwah, the
Gomez decision was rendered when the notion that there might
be particular concerns in assessing human rights violations or
persecution against women was first recognized. Gender-based
harm as a basis for seeking asylum, and, as such, presenting
its own set of issues, had not yet been recognized in any mean-
ingful way. By comparison, Melgar,52 the third decision in the
Second Circuit trilogy, was rendered in 1999, shortly after the
"9 See, e.g., Regina v. Immigr. Appeal Tribunal and another ex parte Shah;
Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 11999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L.) (finding
women subject to state-tolerated domestic violence to constitute a "particular social
group"); Refugee Division, V95-02904 (Canada, Nov. 26, 1997) (granting refugee
protection to a woman from the Ukraine on the basis of membership in a gender-
based particular social group); Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal
No. 2039/93 (New Zealand, Feb. 12, 1996) (granting refugee protection to a woman
from Iran and sustaining a decision by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR,
which stated that "women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment
due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live
may be considered as a 'particular social group' within the meaning of the ...
Convention"). For a collection of decisions from several jurisdictions and summaries
of other decisions raising gender issues, including the Canada and New Zealand
decisions cited in this note, see generally REFUGEE LAW CENTER COMPILATION,
supra note 47.
" Abankwah received some publicity because she was held in immigration
detention for over two years. Several New York elected officials and other leaders
spoke out on her behalf, including Representative Carolyn Malloney, Senator
Charles Schumer, and Gloria Steinem. See, e.g., Federal Court Update: Summaries
of Recent Immigration Decisions: Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, 76 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 1328 (Sept. 3, 1999).
5' 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
52 191 F.3d 307.
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Abankwah decision and long after gender had been identified
as a crucial component in understanding and addressing hu-
man rights issues. Despite the vast changes in human rights
and refugee discourse concerning gender-based harm interna-
tionally, and in U.S. asylum law, the Second Circuit's approach
and analysis in Melgar seems to have more in common with
the much earlier decision in Gomez than with the
contextualized assessment in Abankwah.
To better understand the Second Circuit's later decision in
Melgar, it is useful to first examine the court's 1991 Gomez
decision. Unfortunately, the Gomez decision does not contain
much useful language for an in-depth analysis; however, a look
at the administrative record in the case below gives some in-
sight into the Second Circuit's analysis of the claim.53 The
petitioner, Carmen Gomez, is a Salvadoran woman who fled El
Salvador after having been repeatedly raped and beaten by the
guerrilla forces.54 The abuse continued over a two-year period,
from the time Gomez was twelve until she reached fourteen
years old." Four years later, when she was eighteen years
' Significantly, there is no transcript of the testimony adduced from Ms.
Gomez on direct examination when she presented the substance of her claim for
asylum. Apparently there was a problem with the recording device and none of
her testimony was recorded. The parties, through counsel, consented to have the
IJ read his notes summarizing her testimony into the record. See Brief of the
Immigration & Naturalization Service in Opposition to the Petition for Review at
4 n.*, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-4025) (on file with au-
thor).
" Gomez, 947 F.2d at 662.
'5 Id. This period, 1973-1975, marked the early stages of a civil war that
raged in El Salvador with increasing intensity throughout the 1980s. Over the
course of the war, it is estimated that upwards of 70,000 people, mostly unarmed
civilians, were killed, and large numbers were arrested, detained, interrogated, tor-
tured, and otherwise harmed. See Temporary Suspension of Deportation for Nation-
als of Certain Countries: Hearings on H.R. 822 Before the Subcommittee on Immi-
gration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong. 7 (1985) (statement of Rep. Moakley). Some two million people from El
Salvador are believed to have either crossed an international border seeking refuge
or remained uprooted within El Salvador as internally displaced persons. Id. It
has been widely documented that the vast majority of these human rights abuses
were perpetrated by the Salvadoran military and paramilitary groups that oper-
ated with impunity in that country for years. See generally EL SALVADOR'S DECADE
OF TERROR: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO
(1991); Report of the United Nations Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically
Motivated Illegal Armed Groups, U.N. SCOR S/1994/989 (Oct. 22, 1994) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. Joint Group Report]; UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS TRUTH COMMIS-
SION REPORT: FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE 12 YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR
[Vol. 66: 2
GENDER IN THE ASYLUM LAW CONTEXT
old, she was finally able to flee El Salvador."6 Based on her
brutal treatment by the guerrillas in El Salvador, Gomez
framed her claim for asylum as being "on account of" her mem-
bership in a particular social group. She defined her social
group as "women who have been previously battered and raped
by Salvadoran guerrillas.""7 The court examined a number of
factors in reaching its conclusion that "[plossession of broadly-
based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by
itself endow individuals with membership in a particular social
group.""8 Most significantly, the court found that Gomez
"failed to produce evidence that women who have previously
been abused by the guerrillas possess common characteris-
tics... such that would-be persecutors could identify them as
(1993). For a compelling recounting of one of the worst massacres that occurred
over the course of the war, and a critical examination of U.S. involvement in that
war, see generally MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE (1994). As dis-
cussed in Gomez and elsewhere, Peace Accords were signed in El Salvador in 1992
after protracted negotiations and with much controversy and discord. The rampant
human rights abuses that had occurred during the height of the war years dissi-
pated following the signing of the Accords, yet many human rights observers, in-
cluding the United Nations itself, found continuing human rights violations on a
fairly broad scale. See, e.g., U.N. Joint Group Report, supra.
" Although four years may seem a long time to remain in El Salvador, it is
clear from the record that there were important reasons why she did not leave,
and perhaps could not have left sooner. She was very young when the rapes and
beatings occurred, she was an orphan, alone in the world without family, and she
was living with a woman who had agreed to take her in exchange for housekeep-
ing and other chores. See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 662; Brief for Petitioner Gomez in
Support of Petition for Review to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals at 3, Gomez
v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-4025).
57 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663. This characterization of the social group closely
resembles that used by the respondents in an earlier decision before the Ninth
Circuit. In Sanchez.Trujillo, the court rejected as being over broad a social group
defined as "young, urban, working class males of military age who have never
served in the military or otherwise expressed support for the government." 801
F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). The ruling in this decision as to the criteria for
establishing membership in a particular group was recently overturned by the
Ninth Circuit. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that membership in a particular social group does not require a voluntary
associational relationship).
" Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664. These factors included, inter alia, the court's find-
ing that the social group attributes were not recognizable or discrete. Id. Another
problem with the definition of this social group is that it is somewhat circular,
defining the social group by the fact of the harm suffered, i.e., people who face
persecution because they have been subjected to rape and assault in the past. De-
fining the social group by the harm is problematic, though it certainly is possible
that a group might exist that is defined by the fact that its members are harmed
or have been harmed in the past and as such may be subject to future harm.
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members of the purported group.""9 The Court further stated,
"Indeed, there is no indication that Gomez would be singled
out for further brutalization on this basis."' Here, as in
Abankwah, the court based its decision squarely on the ques-
tion of sufficiency of the evidence in the record. What differs is
the court's understanding and interpretation of the evidence,
leading to its conclusion in Gomez that the Board's decision
denying the asylum claim was supported by substantial evi-
dence, but in Abankwah, it was not.
Gomez was decided during a very tumultuous period in
U.S. asylum law history. To gain greater insight into the sig-
nificance of the circuit court's decision affirming Gomez' denial
of asylum, it may prove helpful to examine the historical back-
ground of her case. While Gomez was pending, the INS settled
a major class action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs asserted
the existence of rampant prejudice and undue influence of
foreign policy considerations in the asylum law adjudication
process, at least regarding asylum claims brought by
Salvadoran and Guatemalan nationals.6' The American Bap-
tist Churches settlement (the "ABC settlement") required, inter
alia, the re-adjudication of all asylum claims of qualified
Salvadorans and Guatemalans, even if their cases had already
been through the entire administrative adjudication process.62
As the first major class action lawsuit challenging the fairness
of the asylum adjudication process in the United States, this
settlement had far-reaching ramifications.63
59 Id.
Go Id. Here, the court relied on an erroneous articulation of the asylum stan-
dard-that an individual must demonstrate she would be "singled out" for persecu-
tion. This does not reflect the actual standard. Now codified in the regulations at
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2), it had already been made clear in 1987 by the Court in
Cardoza-Fonseca that a well-founded fear does not require a showing that one
would be singled out. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Rather, a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion is sufficiently demonstrated if the prospect of future persecution is a "reason-
able possibility" or a "one in ten chance." Id. at 440. Alternatively, as the statute
and the regulations make plain, past persecution alone could be sufficient to estab-
lish eligibility for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2000).
6 American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal.
1991). In reaching this settlement, the INS specifically did not concede the truth
of any of these factual allegations. Nonetheless, the agency did agree to settle the
case rather than proceed through a full trial on the merits of the claims.
62 Id. at 797-99.
' For a discussion of the ABC settlement, its provisions, and its significance in
U.S. asylum law adjudication, see generally Robert M. Cannon, A Reevaluation of
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Simultaneously with the ABC settlement, the Department
of Justice published long-awaited final regulations governing
the implementation of the 1980 Refugee Act, specifically the
rules for adjudication of asylum claims. 4 Among the changes
in the asylum adjudication process, these new regulations
established an INS asylum officer corps of individuals who
were to be specially trained in asylum law, human rights law,
and assessment of country conditions and practices. This corps
would serve as the sole body of INS officials to assess asylum
claims raised affirmatively before the INS.65
During this same time period, and also while the Gomez
case was pending, Congress passed the Immigration Act of
1990, which included a new remedy-Temporary Protected
Status ("TPS")-for victims of civil strife, natural disaster, and
other so-called temporary reasons for displacement or inability
to return to their home country."6 For an individual to be able
to seek this remedy, which continues to be part of immigration
law today, the Attorney General must first designate the coun-
try of origin as one whose nationals are eligible for TPS based
on new or recent conditions in the country.6"
In addition to the general TPS, Congress passed a sepa-
rate provision designating El Salvador as a country whose
nationals should be allowed to apply for TPS. In this provision,
Congress delineated similar, though somewhat more stringent,
eligibility criteria for Salvadorans to be granted TPS.6" This
new remedy granted eligible Salvadorans permission to remain
the Relationship of the Administrative Procedure Act in Asylum Hearings: The
Ramifications of the American Baptist Churches' Settlement, 5 ADMIN. L. J. 713
(Fall 1991).
64 55 Fed. Reg. 30674-88 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208). For a
discussion of the final regulations just prior to their official promulgation, see
generally Arthur Helton, Final Asylum Rules: Finally, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES
789 (July 23, 1990).
" For a discussion of the asylum officer corps and issues related to the then-
new regulations, see generally Helton, supra note 65.
66 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, Title III § 302(a), Title VI
§ 603(a)(24), 104 Stat. 5030, 5084 (Nov. 29, 1990). The provisions governing the
general TPS are currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000).
67 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b).
68 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5036 (Nov.
29, 1990). This provision, which was not incorporated into the Immigration &
Nationality Act, differed from, and was somewhat more restrictive than, the gener-
al TPS provisions in several respects. A comparison and discussion of the eligibili-
ty criteria and related matters is beyond the scope of this Article.
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in the United States temporarily and to receive authorization
to work during this period.69
The new remedy of TPS, the landmark ABC settlement,
and the final asylum regulations, heralded a new age for all
asylum seekers in this country, especially for those from El
Salvador. It is against this backdrop that Ms. Gomez, herself a
Salvadoran, brought her claim before the Second Circuit."
These developments presented new complexities for many
asylum claims pending at that time, yet, the Gomez court
seemed unimpressed with their significance. The court did
briefly address and reject Gomez' argument that because El
Salvador was "in the midst of ongoing armed conflicts,"" TPS
"creates a presumption that all Salvadorans are refugees."72
The Second Circuit may have made a sound ruling in dismiss-
ing the argument that TPS should lessen the burden of proof
on asylum applicants from El Salvador and be taken as an
objective basis for the well-founded nature of their fear. This
conclusion, nevertheless, did not obviate the need for the court
to closely examine the implications of the recent changes re-
" Because the remedy was temporary and went into effect quickly, the terms
of the ABC settlement allowing for re-adjudication of asylum claims for
Salvadorans were held in abeyance for those Salvadorans who qualified and timely
registered for TPS. The initial grant of TPS was for a period of eighteen months
and then extended for an additional twelve months. See, e.g., 70 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 1394 (October 18, 1993). The second extension also entailed changing the
designation from TPS to Deferred Enforced Departure ("DED"). 58 Fed. Reg. 32157
(June 8, 1993). These remedies were subsequently subsumed into the ABC settle-
ment. American Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. at 799.
70 Despite the efforts of Gomez' counsel, none of the arguments presented to
the Second Circuit on these points prevailed. See generally Brief for Petitioner
Carmen Gomez to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Support of Petition for
Review, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-4025); Reply Brief for
Petitioner Carmen Gomez, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-
4025). Resolution of questions as to the eligibility of Gomez to either TPS or relief
under the ABC settlement, which incorporated aspects of the new asylum regula-
tions, is beyond the scope of this Article; however, given her criminal conviction,
see infra note 76 and accompanying text, it is likely that she would not have been
eligible for TPS, which was precluded for those with two or more misdemeanor
convictions or any felony conviction. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A) (2000). As to her eli-
gibility for ABC, only a conviction for an aggravated felony would constitute a bar
based on criminal grounds. There is some dispute in the record as to whether she
was convicted of an aggravated felony. See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 665. Some of the
implications of her criminal conviction are discussed infra at notes 75-77 and ac-
companying text.
71 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664 (citations omitted).
72 Id.
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garding Salvadorans in particular, and in asylum law gener-
ally, in assessing whether Gomez had established a viable
asylum claim. The Second Circuit failed to do that; the court
did not address her claim in the context of the harm she had
endured, the country conditions at the time she sought asylum,
and the recognition by Congress and the INS that Salvadorans
deserved more generous treatment under U.S. asylum law
than they had previously received. 3
There was a subset of issues in the Gomez case that de-
tracted from the strength of Gomez' claim and perhaps made it
easier for the court to uphold the denial of asylum by the
Board. Apparently, a conviction for three counts of sale of co-
caine74 had been entered against her just prior to the com-
mencement of the immigration proceedings.75 Criminal con-
7s There is the added factor of the need for an understanding of the gendered
nature of rape, which had not yet been recognized in any significant way in the
context of U.S. asylum law.
" Brief for Petitioner Carmen Gomez to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Support of Petition for Review at 4, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991)
(No. 91-4025). Among the crimes that carry the most severe penalties under the
immigration laws are those relating to sale of controlled substances. See generally
Morawetz, supra note 33.
" After years of living on her own in the United States, Gomez had fallen on
hard times. According to the record, she was orphaned as a young child, worked
as a live-in housekeeper for a woman in El Salvador from the age of five until
the age of eighteen when the woman decided to leave for the United States and
allowed Gomez to accompany her. See Brief for Petitioner Carmen Gomez to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Support of Petition for Review at 3-4, Gomez
v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-4025). Upon their arrival in the Unit-
ed States, the woman, identified in the record only as Tarcila, left Gomez to her
own devices. Id. After surviving on her own for nine years, Gomez was without
work and without money. Id. at 4. In a desperate move to stay housed and fed,
she resorted to selling drugs. Id. In the span of three months, she was arrested
three times and, in the end, pleaded guilty to three counts of sale of cocaine. Id.
After serving one year of a three-year sentence, she was paroled. Brief for Peti-
tioner Carmen Gomez to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Support of Peti-
tion for Review at 4, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 914025).
Changes in immigration law, starting in 1988 and expanded in 1994 and
again in 1996, included adding penalties for convictions of certain statutorily de-
fined crimes determined to be aggravated felonies. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. 10-690, §§ 7341, 7344, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-71 (Nov. 18, 1988);
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103416,
§ 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (Oct. 25, 1994); Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.); IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat.
3009-546 (1996). A full discussion of the meaning of this term, which has steadily
expanded in the intervening years since 1988, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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victions, especially those related to controlled substances, are
treated very harshly under immigration law. Even where a
conviction is not a bar to a requested immigration remedy, that
conviction often generates substantial negativity towards an
individual seeking immigration status.76 It is impossible to
know the extent to which Gomez' conviction may have adverse-
ly influenced the court's assessment of her appeal. It can be
stated with some degree of certainty, however, that, at the
time of the Gomez decision, the court had little exposure to
asylum claims raising gender-based persecution. Unfortunate-
ly, it did not seize this opportunity to begin to grapple with the
complexities of the issue. As a result, there is no attempt to
discern the significance of the rapes that she endured, nor to
examine them as a form of targeted persecution in the context
of civil war.77
In chronological terms, Gomez was rendered at the begin-
ning of the second wave of circuit court decisions confronting
gender issues in asylum law.7" The first wave was comprised
It is important to note, however, that a determination that an individual has been
convicted of an aggravated felony can be dispositive on a range of issues, including
eligibility for a variety of immigration remedies, which today includes asylum. It
can also be an important factor in determining whether an otherwise eligible ap-
plicant warrants a grant of asylum in the exercise of discretion. Under the current
law, the definition of an aggravated felony contains over twenty-one paragraphs. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000). While there was never a clear determination as to
whether Gomez was in fact convicted of an aggravated felony, it must be noted
that the late 1980s and early 1990s mark the beginning of an increasing vigilance
in this country against immigrants who have criminal convictions, whether before
or after entering the country. For a discussion of the heightened impact of crimi-
nal convictions on immigration status over the last twelve years, see generally
Morawetz, supra note 33.
" The asylum law provisions include statutory bars to eligibility based on
criminal convictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2). That list has grown substantially
since 1990, and at the time of the Gomez decision, her convictions did not amount
to a bar. However, given the severe negative implications of criminal convictions
as well as the discretionary nature of a grant of asylum, it is important to recog-
nize the potential impact Gomez' conviction might have had on the way her asy-
lum claim was viewed. Under the law today, that conviction most likely would bar
her from asylum eligibility. Id.
7' This recognition did eventually come, first in the context of Bosnia and then
Rwanda, with lesser success. See infra note 86.
78 Other decisions rendered during this time, albeit after Gomez had been de-
cided, include, among others, Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (find-
ing "that a group of women . . . who refuse to conform [to restrictive social mores
for Iranian women] and whose opposition is so profound that would choose to
suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance" may satisfy the eligibility re-
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essentially of two circuit court decisions-both decided in 1987,
both raised by Salvadorans, and both involving rape.79 The
Gomez case was first presented to the Immigration Judge (the
"IJ") scarcely three years after those early decisions. As a prac-
tical matter, even in 1991 when the Second Circuit issued its
decision in Gomez, international human rights and refugee law
quirements for asylum and finding that Safaie had failed to meet this standard);
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1993) (ruling, inter alia, that feminism
constitutes a political opinion); Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 151 (6th Cir. 1992)
(finding that sexual harassment and assault, coercion, and threats in employment
did not rise to the level of persecution on account of one of the five grounds but
rather indicated sexual flirtation and interest). These decisions also raise inter-
esting issues for comparison that are beyond the scope of this Article. For a dis-
cussion of some of these cases and their significance, see generally Pamela
Goldberg, U.S. Law and Women Asylum Seekers: Where Are They and Where are
They Going?, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 889 (July 8, 1996).
" See Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that
Campos-Guardado had not established eligibility for asylum); Lazo-Majano v. INS,
813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that Lazo-Majano had established eligibility
for asylum). Campos-Guardado, a Salvadoran woman, and her three cousins were
brutally raped by two men. Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 287. During the rapes,
an older woman who had accompanied the men shouted political slogans. Id. Just
before the women were raped they had been forced to watch while the attackers
hacked the flesh from Campos-Guardado's uncle and a male cousin before shooting
them to death. Id. Her uncle had been the chairman of a local agricultural cooper-
ative in support of agrarian land reform, a crucial issue in the civil war in El
Salvador. Id. The Fifth Circuit found that the Board did not err as a matter of
law in denying her asylum claim. Id at 286-87.
Lazo-Majano was decided less than two months later in the Ninth Circuit.
There the court held that Lazo-Majano, also from El Salvador, had been persecut-
ed on account of her political opinion by a sergeant in the army who "cynically"
accused her of being a subversive and threatened to turn her in to the authorities
unless she submitted to his demands for sex and did whatever household work he
demanded of her. Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1435. These two cases represent the
full complement of circuit court decisions where harm specific to women had been
raised as the basis or pivotal factor for seeking asylum. The Board had not yet
addressed this issue in a reported decision except once in a decision predating the
1980 Refugee Act. In Matter of Pierre, the Board denied withholding of deportation
to a Haitian who feared her violently abusive husband, a deputy in the Haitian
government. Significantly, the Board ruled that "persecution at the hands of indi-
viduals not connected with any government" could support a claim for this relief.
15 I & N Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975) (emphasis added).
These early cases have been discussed in a number of articles on the subject
of gender-based persecution. See generally Pamela Goldberg, Any Place But Home:
Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence, 26 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 565 (1993); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing Asylum
Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625 (1993); David L. Neal, Note, Women
as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 203 (1988).
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discourse had not yet begun to recognize and incorporate gen-
der as a fundamental concern.
Prior to 1993, human rights violations perpetrated against
women were not commonly understood as human rights viola-
tions per se. 0 Rather, violations against women tended to be
disregarded, even demeaned, and generally were viewed as
less important than the harms faced by men.81 The INS mir-
rored these prevailing views in the arguments it made in
Gomez. 2
Gomez testified that armed members of the opposition
forces had attacked her-in her home--on five separate occa-
sions. On each of those five occasions they assaulted her, and
on several occasions, she was brutally raped.' However, in its
brief to the Second Circuit, the INS argued that these five at-
tacks, on five separate occasions, occurring over the course of
two years, were nothing more than "isolated incidents of crimi-
nal behavior." 4 Counsel for Gomez vigorously argued the ab-
surdity of such conjecture but did not prevail. Rape as a form
of coercion and control in the context of civil strife and war has
since gained broad recognition as a politically motivated and
specifically targeted human rights violation or persecution.85
8 See supra Part II.
81 See generally Mertus & Goldberg, supra note 37.
82 See generally Brief of the Immigration & Naturalization Service in Opposi-
tion to the Petition for Review, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No.
91-4025).
' The Board's decision, as contained in the Record of the case, indicates that
she had been raped and beaten on five separate occasions. Gomez Joint Appendix
at 4 & n.3, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-4025).
8 Brief of the Immigration & Naturalization Service in Opposition to the Peti-
tion for Review at 16, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-4025).
The INS also asserted that Gomez was not eligible for asylum because she was
not "singled out" for persecution. Id. at 15. Notwithstanding that an individual
need not establish that she would be 'singled out" for persecution to demonstrate
eligibility for asylum, see supra note 61, the record clearly established that in fact
she was singled out, on five separate occasions, at her place of residence, and
while she was still a child between the ages of twelve and fourteen. Gomez, 947
F.2d at 662. It is not clear from the record why the issue of past persecution was
not more fully addressed.
"' This perspective on rape occurred due to a constellation of factors, including
the Vienna Human Rights Conference, the Asylum and Refugee Guidelines raising
gender concerns, and, certainly of central impact, the tragic use of rape on a hor-
rendously large scale in Bosnia and Rwanda. In this context, rape is considered to
be targeted at women as a means of asserting control over the larger community
through the actual harm and injury rape causes as well as through its impact in
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The Board itself has since recognized that rape can constitute
a form of politically motivated persecution.86
There is no way of knowing whether Gomez might have
been argued or decided differently if the understanding of rape
as a form of gender-based harm had been more developed at
that time. Indeed, the court places two important qualifiers
on its ruling. The court states that it neither "discount[s] the
physical and emotional pain that has been wantonly inflicted
on these Salvadoran women,"8 nor "suggest[s] that women
who have been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by
particular attackers cannot assert a well-founded fear of perse-
cution." 9 This language is significant. In the context of the
terrorizing the community, both by making women feel especially vulnerable and
by the shame, humiliation, and degradation it can bring to the community as a
whole. See generally Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments
of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INTL L. 97
(Jan. 1999); Beth Stephens, Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to
Centuries of Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 87 (1999); see also supra note
40.
,G In re D-V-, Interim Decision 3252 (BIA 1993). Some scholars and coymmenta-
tors have written specifically about rape in the asylum law context. See, e.g.,
Deborah Anker, Rape in the Community as a Basis for Asylum: The Treatment of
Women Refugees' Claims to Protection in Canada and the United States (Parts I &
II), 2 BENDER'S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 476 (July 15, 1997) (Part I) and 2
BENDER'S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 608 (August 1, 1997) (Part II).
' For a groundbreaking work on rape as a form of violence, domination, and
control, see generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINsT OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND
RAPE (1975).
" Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664 (emphasis added). Emphasis is placed on "these"
women to underscore the fact that the court is, on some level, recognizing that
there are others who fit the social group description, not just Gomez. Thus, it is
conceivable that the Court could find a social group here if, perhaps, the definition
had been more refined or there had been stronger evidence demonstrating that
young women had been targeted by the opposition.
" Id. The court then states that it "cannot, however, find that Gomez has
demonstrated that she is more likely to be persecuted than any other young wom-
an." Id. The court seems to be requiring that Gomez show that she would be
singled out for persecution, which, as discussed at supra note 85, is not an accu-
rate statement of the standard. Further, the court seems to be applying the stan-
dard for withholding of deportation to the asylum request. The standard for the
mandatory relief of withholding of deportation, applicable at the time of the Gomez
decision, called for a showing that one's "life or freedom would be in danger." 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (2000). In INS v. Stevic, the Court interpreted this to require a
showing of clear probability of danger or that such harm would be "more likely
than not" to occur. 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). This is a higher standard than a
showing of a "reasonable possibility" of harm required for the protection of asylum,




decision as a whole, the court's statement leaves open the
possibility that gender could form the basis of a particular
social group if the other concerns expressed by the court are
met.9° The two principle concerns the court raises are that
gender must be established as a cognizable attribute and that
credible evidence must support the fact that it serves as a
basis for persecuting at least some members of the popula-
tion.91 Although this sounds promising, to some extent these
concerns had already been addressed in existing case law.
Certainly, the Board had already established gender, i.e., sex,
as a prototype for a cognizable social group.92 Moreover, it had
also been established, by the time of the Gomez decision, that
an asylum applicant's uncorroborated testimony can be suffi-
cient to establish eligibility for asylum where that testimony is
credible.93 Still, the dicta in Gomez gave reason to be optimis-
tic about the possibility of more expansive treatment of rape or
" Significantly, in Gomez, the legal theory on which the asylum claim was
based became the heart of the issue on appeal to the Second Circuit. The question
was whether Gomez was a member of a cognizable social group, and if so, wheth-
er she suffered in the past or had a well-founded fear of future persecution "on
account of" that social group membership. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664. The Circuit
Court ruled that Gomez failed to define a particular social group and therefore she
could not have been persecuted or fear future persecution on account of member-
ship in that social group. Id.
91 Id.
92 Although there is no published decision that has upheld an asylum claim
raising gender as the sole defining characteristic of a particular social group, by
the time Gomez was decided, the Board had already established the possibility of
such a social group in a landmark decision. See In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211
(BIA 1985). In Acosta, the Board defined a social group as being either an immu-
table characteristic or one so fundamental to a person's conscience or identity that
she either cannot change it or should not be compelled to change it. Id. at 233.
The Board ruled, inter alia, that "sex" constitutes an immutable characteristic. Id.
Notwithstanding that there are distinctions between "sex" and "gender," see supra
note 36, these terms have been used interchangeably in the asylum case law. The
Acosta ruling on the meaning of a particular social group has been cited favorably
by U.S. circuit courts and by a number of foreign jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lwin v.
INS, 144 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1998); Regina v. Immigr. Appeal Tribunal and another
ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545
(H.L.) (finding women subject to state-tolerated domestic violence to constitute a
"particular social group"); Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, 2 S.C.R. 689 (Cana-
da 1993) (agreeing with and elaborating on Acosta's social group definition); Refu-
gee Appeal No. 1312/93 (New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Aug. 30,
1995), reprinted in GENDER ASYLUM LAW IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 547 (granting
refugee protection to a man from Iran based on his membership in the banned
Tudeh Party and his sexual orientation).
93 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000).
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other gender-based harm in future asylum law decisions by the
Second Circuit. When the court was finally presented with an
opportunity to fulfill this promising approach, it reached mixed
results. 4
Although the Second Circuit issued several important
decisions concerning asylum eligibility after Gomez, for almost
a decade, none of the cases explicitly raised the issue of gender
or the issue of determining what might constitute a particular
social group." The court then rendered two decisions in rapid
succession in 1999. The second of these, Melgar de Torres,96
though distinguishable from Gomez, provides an opportunity to
examine the court's treatment of essentially similar claims
over an eight-year time span. The richness of the comparison
makes it useful to discuss Melgar before reaching the first
gender decision in 1999, Abankwah.97
The facts of the claim in Gomez occurred during the early
phase of what became a long and brutal civil war,9 whereas
the facts of the claim in Melgar arose in the last stages of that
war, during the violent aftermath of the signing of the January
1992 Peace Accords. 9 Both women were raped, but unlike
Gomez, who identified her attackers as guerrillas, Melgar
believed her perpetrators to be members of the government's
armed forces."'0 And, unlike Gomez, Melgar did not base her
claim specifically on the rape. The essence of Gomez' claim con-
cerned the repeated rapes she endured, in her own home,1"'
" See generally Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999); Melgar de
Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999).
" For a brief reference to some of the significant asylum decisions rendered by
the Second Circuit during this period, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Asylum claims that raise gender as an essential component, like any other asylum
claim, can be based on any of the five enumerated statutory grounds. Membership
in a particular social group is frequently used in this context.
'G Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999).
" 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999). Abankwah was decided on July 9, 1999, and
Melgar on August 19, 1999.
98 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 662; see also supra note 56.
' Melgar, 191 F.3d at 309.
' Id. at 309, 312.
101 Actually, the home was that of the woman who had taken her in when she
was a young orphan. She was raised by this woman, identified in the record only
as Tarcila, not as her adopted child but more as a live-in housekeeper. See Brief
for Petitioner Gomez in Support of Petition for Review to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals at 3, Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-4025). None-
theless, the record establishes that she lived in the home with Tarcila for some
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which she framed as persecution on account of her membership
in a particular social group. Melgar, who endured rape on one
occasion,112 presented her claim very differently.
One critical difference between these two cases is that
Melgar demonstrated two bases for asylum eligibility."3 The
facts of her claim reveal both an actual, and most certainly, an
imputed political opinion as one basis. In addition, she present-
ed what is considered by many courts to be the prototype of
membership in a particular social group-family relation-
ship.0 4 Melgar married in 1985 at the age of eighteen; how-
ever, her husband left El Salvador some eight months later,
seeking safe haven in the United States.0 5 With his depar-
ture in 1986, she went to live with her uncle in a different
village. She did not remain in the village where she and her
husband had lived because it was controlled by the military
and, since her husband had fled rather than serve in the mili-
tary, she believed she would be suspected and targeted as
either a member or supporter of the opposition.0 6
The town in which her uncle lived was one the guerrillas
traveled through frequently, and, as the court noted, although
her uncle "was not an FMLN guerrilla, he helped the guerril-
eleven years before the two fled El Salvador together. Id. The record indicates
that it was Tarcila who made the decision to flee and "allowed" Carmen Gomez to
accompany her if she so chose. Id; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102 The Record indicates that she was raped twice, but there is no explanation
about the second rape. See Melgar Joint Appendix at 197, Melgar de Torres v.
Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124) (stating in Melgar's application, "I
was raped twice by a soldier from the Salvadoran military, I cannot say why it
happened"). One plausible interpretation is that she was raped twice on the same
occasion when the soldiers raided her home. It is also possible that she was refer-
ring to the incidents that led to the birth of her children. About that she states
that her children were "fathered by a military man who took advantage of me in
my husband's absence." Id. at 226.
" See generally Petitioner's Brief to the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in Support of Petition for Review and Petitioner's Reply Brief, Melgar de
Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124).
104 See, e.g., Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1997); Gebremichael v.
INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993); Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576, overruled
on other grounds by Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000);
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
105 Melgar's husband feared forcible recruitment and possible death at the hands
of the military, a fate his own brother had in fact suffered some three years earli-
er. Melgar Joint Appendix at 98, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4124).
10" Melgar, 191 F.3d at 309.
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las by giving them food and allowing them to sleep in his
house." °7 The court agreed that Melgar "assisted her uncle in
those endeavors" during the time that she lived with him.0 8
In November 1992, eleven months after the signing of the 1992
Peace Accords, Melgar's uncle went on a short trip. She never
saw her uncle again. He had been murdered, and his body,
which was found seven days later, was in such a condition that
he was buried immediately."°9 Although the killers were nev-
er identified, Melgar and others believed he was assassinated
by the military because he had aided the armed opposition."0
Melgar remained in the village with her two young chil-
dren, her aunt, and her aunt's two daughters. Scarcely a
month after her uncle's murder, military soldiers stormed their
home and raped Melgar and the other women."' Apparently,
Melgar was unable to substantiate to the satisfaction of the
court that this attack was deliberate against her and her fami-
ly members because of their support of the guerrillas and be-
cause of their family connection to her recently murdered un-
cle."' It is difficult to imagine how that causal connection
Id. FMLN is the acronym for the armed opposition, the Frente Farabundo
Marti Liberacion Nacional or Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. See id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
1, Melgar, 191 F.3d at 310.
m Id. In Melgar's brief to the Second Circuit, she states that she was raped
and the other women were abused by soldiers. See Petitioner's Brief to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Support of Petition for Review at 9, Melgar
de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124). The Board's decision
refers to the rapes of Melgar, her cousins, and her aunt. Melgar Joint Appendix at
2, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124). The Cir-
cuit Court also states that "soldiers came to her uncle's home-where Melgar con-
tinued to live with her aunt and cousins-and raped the women, including
Melgar." Melgar, 191 F.3d at 309. In this Article, the rapes will be referred to as
having been committed against Melgar, her aunt, and her cousins.
112 A review of the record reveals the apparent difficulty Melgar had in testi-
fying. Her entire direct testimony is barely ten pages long. See Melgar Joint Ap-
pendix at 8-18, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
4124). One concern that is always present when testimony must be translated
from one language to another is the adequacy of the translation. This includes not
only the level of precision of the interpreter, but also, and in some ways even
more importantly, the intonations, hesitations, and delivery of the interpreter. The
manner in which an interpreter "testifies" can affect witness credibility as well as
diminish the overall impact of the witness' testimony. See generally Angela
McCaffrey, Don't Get Lost in Translation: Teaching Law Students to Work with
Language Interpreters, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 347 (2000); Franklyn P. Salimbene,
Court Interpreters: Standards of Practice and Standards for Training, 6 CORNELL
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could not have been made, given the timing of the two inci-
dents, the country conditions, and the activities of Melgar and
her uncle.'
One troublesome aspect of the presentation of the claim is
that Melgar's testimony was very brief. Moreover, she did not
provide any details of the rape.'14 More information, such as
how long the attackers remained on the premises, how they
were dressed, what if anything they said, and other details
surrounding the rapes and assaults would very likely have
helped to establish the persecutory nature of the rapes;...
such information might have also lent further credibility to her
testimony."6 At the same time, it must be underscored that
J.L. & PUB. POLY 645 (1997). In immigration proceedings, although the entire
testimony is recorded in the native language spoken by the witness and the subse-
quent English interpretation, the record only contains the English interpretation.
The exact content and presentation of the testimony of any non-English speaking
witness is lost the moment the tape is transcribed. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.3(c), 3.28,
3.36, 240.9 (2001).
113 It is interesting to note that counsel for Melgar did not argue that the rape
was past persecution or perpetrated on account of any of the five enumerated
grounds. Moreover, an examination of the record reveals that Melgar testified only
that she had been raped, without providing anything further about the attack. See
Melgar Joint Appendix at 60, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4124). She was not questioned about the rape on cross examination.
On re-cross examination, she was asked only whether she was contending she had
been raped by soldiers, and, when it happened, whether the father of her children
was present at that time, and whether she had any documentary evidence corrobo-
rating the rape. Id. at 93-94. Her responses to these questions were, respectively,
yes, she had been raped by soldiers about a month after her uncle was killed; no,
the children's father was not present; and no, she did not have any corroborating
evidence of the rape. Id. The IJ asked no questions about the rape. See Brief of
Petitioner Melgar de Torres to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals at 9 n.6,
Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124) ("Both the
Immigration Judge and the Board commented on the lack of details about the
rape. It is difficult to imagine what details about the rape would add to the re-
cord while the anguish and embarrassment such recounting would cause the peti-
tioner is obvious. She was not asked for details on direct or cross or by the
Judge.").
114 Melgar's entire direct testimony encompasses less than ten pages in the
record. See Melgar Joint Appendix at 54-56, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d
307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124).
115 The IJ states in her decision that, through counsel, Melgar "conceded that
her rape by a Salvadoran soldier does not constitute past persecution because
there is no evidence that his motive was to punish or persecute her on account of
one of the five grounds." Decision of the Immigration Judge at 11, Melgar Joint
Appendix at 27, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
4124) (citations and footnote omitted).
... Both the IJ and the Board found her to be credible. See Melgar de Torres,
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it is quite conceivable that testifying about the details of the
rape might well have caused Melgar great anguish, psychologi-
cal trauma, and perhaps even shame.117 Melgar did not, how-
ever, base her claim on the rape itself. Rather, she argued that
she had established eligibility for asylum based on the totality
of the circumstances. These circumstances included on-going
human rights abuses in El Salvador-the persecution by the
military of people, like Melgar and her uncle, who were be-
lieved to have assisted the armed opposition; the murder of her
uncle by men believed to be in the military; and the subse-
quent rapes of Melgar and her family members, also believed
to have been perpetrated by military men."' Melgar further
argued that, as a close family member who lived with her
uncle for many years, his brutal murder was targeted not only
against him, but also against her. The pain and suffering she
experienced as a result of his murder, combined with the anxi-
ety of realizing that she could be murdered next, was so severe
and traumatic that it constituted persecution against her as
well. 11
9
Central to Melgar's claim were two correlative arguments.
First, she argued that the conditions that existed in El Salva-
dor when she fled were such that a reasonable person in her
circumstances would have feared persecution. 2 ° Second, she
argued that, notwithstanding the signing of the 1992 Peace
Accords, her claim for asylum remained viable.12" ' This latter
argument consisted of two components: First, the harm that
191 F.3d at 312.
117 See generally LINDA FOREST, FORCIBLE RAPE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INFORIMA-
TION (1977); THE RAPE VICTIM (Deanna R. Nass ed., 1977).
1.. See generally Brief of Petitioner Melgar de Torres to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
4124).
" Id. at 18-19. In her Reply Brief, Melgar argues more fully the standard,
articulated in 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (2000), that an individual may establish
eligibility for asylum if she can show a "pattern or practice of persecuting similar-
ly situated individuals on account of [one of the five enumerated grounds]" without
having to establish that the asylum seeker herself had been, or would be, singled
out for persecution. See Reply Brief of Petitioner Melgar de Torres to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals at 1-5, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4124).
12 Brief of Petitioner Melgar de Torres to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
at 14-15, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124).
121 Id. at 16-17.
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Melgar already had endured occurred after the signing of the
Peace Accords, when there continued to be much instability
and targeted violence by former military personnel against
actual or perceived supporters or members of the armed oppo-
sition. Second, her fear of continued persecution continued to
be well-founded because the general instability and targeted
violence persisted, albeit on a smaller scale, for a number of
years, including the period when she first presented her asy-
lum claim. To support her argument, Melgar submitted sub-
stantial documentary evidence which, although it did not di-
rectly corroborate the specific facts of her claim, clearly demon-
strated that her uncle's murder was most likely politically
motivated and not a random act of criminal violence.122 More-
over, the evidence established that persons similarly situated
to Melgar had been, and continued to be, targeted for persecu-
tion." Constructing the claim in this manner, the rape
Melgar endured is not a central component of her claim but is,
rather, a substantial contributing factor to the totality of her
circumstances. The rape, in conjunction with the other factors,
further supports the argument that Melgar experienced past
persecution 24 and continued to have a well-founded fear of
" The evidence submitted included, inter alia, excerpts from U.N. Joint Group
Report, supra note 56, and a twenty-page expert Declaration from Stanford Univer-
sity Professor of Latin American Studies Terry Karl detailing on-going human
rights violations in El Salvador in the year following the Peace Accords signing.
For a complete index of the documentary evidence, see Melgar Joint Appendix at
i-iii, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124).
" Being "similarly situated" to others who have been targeted for persecution
is an alternative basis to support a claim in circumstances where the individual
has not established that she has been, or would be, "singled out" for persecution.
8 C.F.R. § 208.13. It seems clear that Melgar established that, in fact, she had
been "singled out" for persecution and that she was "similarly situated" to others
who had been targeted for persecution. This combination should have served to
strengthen her claim.
124 There can be more than one possible motivation for the feared or past harm,
so long as at least one of the reasons is connected to a statutory ground. See, e.g.,
Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 781, 790 <7th Cir. 1997); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d
1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994). Melgar's past persecution argument was based on the
fact that the killing of her uncle, a close family member, constituted persecution to
her. See Brief of Petitioner Melgar de Torres to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals at 18-19, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
4124). In addition, Melgar's husband, who had received asylum several years earli-
er, was involved in a controversial project to bring potable water to the village
where they had lived together during their marriage. He testified at her asylum
hearing that he believed he would be targeted by the government and elected
[Vol. 66: 2
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persecution on account of her membership in the particular
social group of her family" and because of her actual or im-
puted support for the armed opposition.
126
Despite the range of facts supporting Melgar's claim, the
Second Circuit ruled that the Board's finding 27 that Melgar
"failed to demonstrate an objective basis for her belief that she
will be persecuted on account of a protected ground [because]
neither her uncle's death nor her own rape supports such a
belief' was supported by substantial evidence. 2 ' Perhaps the
greatest discrepancy between this ruling and the record Melgar
officials in the area because of his involvement in that project. Melgar Joint Ap-
pendix at 102-105, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
4124). He also testified that he would be targeted because he originally fled to
avoid forcible conscription in the armed forces. His brother, who had attempted to
avoid conscription in the Salvadoran army, had been killed. Id. at 98. As a result,
Melgar argued, she would be targeted based on her relationship to her husband.
See Brief of Petitioner Melgar de Torres to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals at
18-19, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124). This
argument, though strenuously made, was mitigated by the fact that she had lived
in the town with her husband for only eight months some ten years prior to mak-
ing her asylum claim and that whatever family identification she had centered
around her relationship with her uncle and his family, with whom she had lived
for seven years after her husband departed for the United States and up until the
time she prepared to leave to come to the United States herself. See Melgar de
Torres, 191 F.3d at 312. Although Melgar and her husband were out of communi-
cation for much of the time after he fled to the United States, and she had two
children by another man during that time period, he helped her flee to the United
States when he heard what had happened to her and her uncle. He also testified
in support of her claim at her hearing. See Melgar Joint Appendix at 97-114,
Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124). It is not
clear from the record whether her children were the result of a consensual rela-
tionship or a coercive one. The father of the children is not identified and, accord-
ing to her testimony, was not present at the time of the rape and assault on her
and her aunt and cousins in 1992. Id. at 86-87.
1" See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (BIA 1985) (ruling that "kinship" is
a prototype of a particular social group).
... See, e.g., Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding
that even if imputed "cynically," a person may face persecution because of a politi-
cal opinion that is imputed to her, regardless of whether she actually holds that
opinion).
" The decision of the Board was not unanimous. In a scathing dissent, Board
Member Rosenberg eloquently details what she perceives as a history of misappli-
cation and misinterpretation of asylum law by the Board. Decision of the BIA,
reproduced in Melgar Joint Appendix at 6-14, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d
307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124). The majority opinion is found at Melgar Joint
Appendix at 2-5, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
4124).
1 Melgar de Torres, 191 F.3d at 313 (citations omitted).
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created is the court's statement that the Board's decision was
supported by substantial evidence "especially in light of the
changed country conditions in El Salvador."129 This finding
makes it clear that the court did not take into account the
substantial documentary evidence submitted, which demon-
strated that human rights violations continued to occur well
after the 1992 Peace Accords were signed.13 Moreover, the
purported changed country conditions did not affect the reality
of the past experience that Melgar, her uncle, and her close
family members had already suffered. Furthermore, like the
Board and the IJ, the Second Circuit gave inappropriately
little weight to the numerous reports that specified that target-
ed violence continued to occur against individuals perceived to
have been members or supporters of the armed opposition. 3 '
Finally, and most dramatically, the court utterly discount-
ed the rapes of Melgar, her aunt, and her cousins. Indeed, even
though the rapes were not presented as a central factor, when
viewed in the totality of her circumstances, Melgar's claim
seems even stronger than the one presented in Gomez. The
Second Circuit's finding in Gomez that five different rapes and
assaults, occurring at the applicant's place of residence and
over the span of two years, were nothing more than coinciden-
tal acts of random criminal violence is highly suspect, even for
1991. However, in light of the advances in the understanding
of gender-based persecution in asylum law, and, particularly,
rape in asylum law, the Melgar court strains credulity when it
characterizes the multiple rapes and violence, occurring just
after a murder that is viewed as a politically motivated assas-
12 Id. (footnote omitted).
130 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
... In a footnote, the court quotes the Board's decision where it acknowledges
that Melgar did submit documentary evidence that human rights violations con-
tinued in El Salvador after the signing of the Peace Accords. Melgar de Torres,
191 F.3d at 314 n.3. The Board continued, "Nonetheless, [Melgar has not shown
that she would be at particular risk of government persecution." Melgar Joint
Appendix at 4, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
4124). This misstates the standard. There is no requirement to show a "particular
risk." Further, the harm need not be from the "government." It is well-established
that the persecutor can be the government or a force that the government either
cannot or will not control; paramilitary groups and former members of the armed
forces could constitute such a force. See, e.g., Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231
(9th Cir. 1988); Matter of McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 544-45 (BIA 1980). For
a discussion of the politicized nature of rape in war, see supra notes 40 and 86.
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sination, as mere coincidental criminal conduct. This finding
ignores the use of rape as a political tool and as a devastating
form of gender-based violence, which, eight years after Gomez,
had become widely understood.
1 2
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kearse succinctly and vivid-
ly captures the salient facts of the case and displays keen in-
sight into the appropriate application of the law to those
facts.133 After reiterating the standard for establishing a well-
founded fear of persecution, Judge Kearse summarizes the
relevant facts and articulates her analysis as follows:
[T]he IJ found that Melgar, her uncle, and her uncle's immediate
family constituted a cognizable social group.... [T]he IJ, apparently
accepting Melgar's belief as to responsibility for this killing, de-
scribed it as "her uncle's murder by the authorities." In December
1992, Melgar, her uncle's wife, and her cousins (i.e., all of the sur-
viving adults in the social group) were raped by members of the
Salvadoran military....
The IJ, despite finding that Melgar had a legitimate subjective
fear based on her past experiences, recommended'34 against asy-
lum, concluding that Melgar had not demonstrated that the authori-
ties "have taken or are inclined to take action harmful to her on the
basis" of her membership in her uncle's family....
More importantly, the Board itself, in accepting the IJ's recom-
mendation to deny asylum, stated that Melgar "has not shown that
she would be at particular risk of government persecution."
As made clear in Cardoza-Fonseca, however, neither more-like-
ly-than-not nor "would be" is the proper test; and it is not clear to
me from either the IJ's decision or the Board's decision that the
correct legal standard was applied.13'
In these few paragraphs, Judge Kearse identified the es-
sential facts, articulated the appropriate standard, and pin-
pointed where in the decisions below the standard was mis-
stated or misapplied. The dissent acknowledges the importance
of the rapes endured by Melgar and her aunt and cousins.
Moreover, Judge Kearse puts that experience in the broader
context of the claim and the country conditions at the time it
1 See, e.g., supra notes 8, 40, & 86.
13 Melgar de Torres, 191 F.3d at 314-16 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
'3' Id. at 315. In fact, the IJ does not simply recommend. The IJ's decision
granting or denying asylum is legally binding unless it is timely appealed to the
Board. In the absence of such an appeal, the decision becomes dispositive. 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.39 (2001).
" Melgar de Torres, 191 F.3d at 315-16 (citations omitted).
2000]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
arose. With incisive eloquence, Judge Kearse places the rapes
in proper perspective as central to Melgar's asylum claim and
treats them as violent persecutory conduct that requires full
consideration in assessing whether the denial of the asylum
claim was warranted. The dissent exemplifies the highest level
of integration of gender in an analytical framework. The dis-
sent also contextualizes the claim and, with neither special
treatment nor defensive justification, performs a nuanced anal-
ysis that recognizes the gendered dimension and assesses it
accordingly. 3 ' Notwithstanding the dissent in Melgar, the
Second Circuit seems to still be a long way from this approach.
The next best alternative to complete and fluid integration of
gender in the analytical framework is to deliberately surface
gender and specifically analyze the gendered dimension of the
harm. The Second Circuit used such an approach in reaching
its decision in Abankwah."7
The Second Circuit characterized the Abankwah case
strictly as an evidentiary question, specifically, whether the
decision by the Board was supported by substantial evi-
dence."' An examination of the sufficiency of the evidence
however, requires an examination of the facts themselves to
determine whether the conclusions reached below were sup-
ported by substantial evidence. The Abankwah court examined
the evidence contextually, considering the gendered nature of
the harm, the treatment of women in the country of origin, and
the social and cultural climate Abankwah fled.
The facts of Abankwah can be synthesized as follows.
Abankwah's mother had fulfilled a spiritual leadership role as
Queen Mother for her tribe, the Nkumssa, in Central
Ghana. 13 9 When her mother died unexpectedly, Abankwah
was next in line to replace her mother as Queen Mother and
assume the duties her mother had performed. To do so,
13 For a well-written discussion of the need to incorporate gender issues into
the asylum adjudicatory process without creating any special category or analysis,
see In re Fauziya Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 at 15-20 (BIA 1996) (Rosenberg, Bd.
Mem., concurring).
'7 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999). A recent BIA decision that exemplifies this con-
textual approach to gender-based asylum claims in a well-developed analysis can
be found in In re Fauziya Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996).
138 Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 21, 22-23.
"' Id. at 20-21.
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Abankwah had to satisfy a two-prong test: she had to establish
that she was a virgin at the time of her "enstoolment" and,
after the enstoolment ceremony, she had to be wed to a man of
the tribe elders' choosing.40 Abankwah had, as a young wom-
an, abandoned her tribal religion and converted to Catholicism.
She had also become sexually involved with a young man
whom she did not marry." She believed that her tribe would
discover she was no longer a virgin, either at the time she was
enstooled, or, most certainly, at the time she was married
following her enstoolment" She further believed that once
the tribe realized she was not a virgin, and was unable to
assume the role of Queen Mother, she would be punished by
being forced to undergo FGM."' She framed her asylum
claim as fear of the infliction of FGM on account of her reli-
gious beliefs and on account of her membership in a particular
social group.'
The IJ found that although Abankwah subjectively had
"an intense fear," it was not reasonable because the govern-
ment of Ghana "[was] taking steps to eliminate the practice of
FGM throughout the country."'45 Thus, the IJ found that
Abankwah would be able to "seek protection from the govern-
ment of Ghana in the form of criminal complaints against any
parties who may practice FGM upon her" and that she would
be able to obtain the assistance of non-governmental organiza-
tions in Ghana that have established shelters for those seeking
to avoid FGM. 46 The IJ also found that Abankwah did not
establish any religious-based persecution. "7 The IJ next con-
"' Id. at 20. The enstoolment ceremony entails several rituals, some of which
are designed to ascertain whether the in-coming Queen Mother is a virgin. Id.
141 Id.
42 Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 20-21.
143 Id.
'" Id. She raised several other bases for her claim, including that the tribe
might kill her for fleeing or for attempting to circumvent her obligation to become
Queen Mother. Id. at 25.
1" Decision of the Immigration Judge at 10, 12; Abankwah Joint Appendix at
71, 73, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304).
,4' Decision of the Immigration Judge at 11; Abankwah Joint Appendix at 72,
Abank:wah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304).
..7 Abankwah Joint Appendix at 73-74, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4304). The IJ found that while Abankwah "does face a challenge in
reconciling her Christian beliefs with her obligations as others see it to be the
queen mother in her village . .. [the IJ must] find that the motive of the village
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sidered whether Abankwah could have found protection in an-
other part of the country, the "internal flight alternative," and
found no such alternative available to her.14 The IJ then ad-
dressed the question of whether Abankwah had established a
"nexus" between her fear of FGM and her membership in a
particular social group. For this analysis, the IJ discussed
whether Abankwah was, in fact, a member of a particular
social group and if so, whether the feared harm would be in-
flicted on account of that membership." On this point, the IJ
found that the social group, "comprised of candidates for the
queen mother position who are unable or unwilling to accept
that position," is "too narrowly drawn to be cognizable.""'
Rather, the IJ determined that:
[The applicant is faced with something that's properly characterized
as an individual predicament. She has a problem which is more kin
[sic] to a personal problem than a problem relating to social groups
or other organizations. I feel that the applicant fears retribution
over what must be classified as personal matters, and accordingly,
there is not a cognizable nexus to one of the protected grounds.15'
leaders is to punish her on account of her religion." Id.
'4' Id. at 74-75.
.. This is a bit odd since the IJ has already found that even if it is true that
she would be subject to FGM, she would be able to obtain protection from the
State as well as from non-governmental organizations, as discussed above. Id. at
73-74.
... Id. at 75. This is the IJ's characterization of the social group. A review of
the record indicates that counsel for Abankwah never articulated a clear definition
of the social group. For example, in a colloquy at the close of the hearing before
the IJ, counsel for Abankwah presented the social group as "[Abankwah] being
female. And also, for the refusal to become a queen mother." Abankwah Joint
Appendix at 226, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304).
Shortly thereafter, counsel identified the social group as "[Abankwah] being a
woman, of her not being a virgin." Id. at 229.
"' Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added). The IJ concludes this portion of his decision
by finding that "it appears that the practice of FGM is basically abolished in the
applicant's area, and as mentioned above, would be imposed as a matter of indi-
vidual punishment rather than a matter of a general practice imposed upon a
particular social group." Id. at 76. Here, the IJ is implicitly acknowledging that
FGM would be imposed as a form of punishment, thereby confirming an essential
component of her claim: that FGM is performed by her tribe as punishment for
not remaining a virgin until marriage. This should not be confused with an erro-
neous assumption that the persecutor must have a punitive intent for the harm to
constitute persecution. As the Board and at least some circuit courts have made
clear, no punitive intent is required for establishing asylum eligibility. See, e.g.,
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the "require-
ment that an alien prove that her persecutor's subjective intent was punitive is
[Vol. 66: 2
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As a result of his belief that Abankwah's problems were "per-
sonal" in nature and not related to any of the five eligibility
grounds for asylum, the IJ determined that, despite finding
her credible and genuinely fearful, Abankwah did not establish
eligibility for asylum.'52 On appeal to the Board, Abankwah
refined her social group, defining it as being comprised of
"women from the Nkumssa tribe who lost virginity prior to
marriage."153 In an unpublished decision, the Board ruled
that Abankwah did not establish past persecution, did not
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution based on
religion, did not provide any support for her claim that there
would be any negative consequences to her refusal to serve as
Queen Mother of her tribe, and did not establish that her "fail-
ure to remain a virgin would result in punishment amounting
to persecution."15 Contrary to the rulings of the IJ, the
Board discounted the evidence Abankwah submitted, finding it
"insufficient to support her claims of persecution."55 Howev-
er, the Board found that Abankwah did establish membership
in a particular social group.5 6
The Board then discussed the evidence, beginning with the
declaration of Kwabena Danso Otumfuor, a friend and confi-
dant of Abankwah's in Ghana. He stated that when Abankwah
told him about her situation, he advised her to flee the coun-
try. He further stated that he believed there would be no place
unwarranted"); In re Fauziya Kasinga, Int. Dec. at 12 (BIA 1996) (finding that a
"subjective," "punitive," or "malignant" intent is not required for harm to constitute
persecution").
"' Abankwah Joint Appendix at 76, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4304).
" Applicant's Brief Appealing Decision of Immigration Judge, Abankwah Joint
Appendix at 29, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304).
1-4 Abankwah Joint Appendix at 4, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4304). The Board also found that she "offered no evidence that the
punishment for refusing to become the Queen Mother is death" and dismissed that
portion of her claim as "unbelievable." Id.
1 S Id.
In fact, the Board implicitly seems to accept both her characterization of the
social group and her membership in it. The Board found that the "evidence [sub-
mitted] is insufficient to support her claims of persecution based upon her mem-
bership in a social group, specifically, 'women of the Nkumssa tribe who did not
remain virgins until marriage.' " Id. (quoting Applicant's Brief Appealing Decision
of Immigration Judge, Abankwah Joint Appendix at 29, Abankwah v. INS, 185
F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304).
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in Ghana where she could safely remain and that, if she were
ever sent back to Ghana, her tribe would continue to search for
her until they found her.'57 The Board dismissed this affida-
vit as being based solely on what Abankwah told Kwabena
Otumfuor and not on any direct personal knowledge or par-
ticular expertise in the matters he addressed.15
The Board also dismissed the affidavit and testimony of
another supporting witness, Victoria Otumfuor. Victoria
Otumfuor stated in her affidavit that she is a naturalized U.S.
citizen, born and raised in Ghana, and a Pentecostal Minis-
ter.159 She stated that she is "familiar with the practice
known as female genital mutilation," knows that FGM is prac-
ticed in Ghana, and personally witnessed it being performed on
young girls. She further stated that she "heard and read about
it later in life" and that in many tribes, "it is inflicted as pun-
ishment for losing virginity before marriage.""6 She stated
that while she did not "know a great deal about [Abankwah's]
tribe, Nkumssa, [Abankwah's] account is consistent with [Vic-
toria Otumfuor's] knowledge of the situation."6' She also as-
serted that she is familiar with the position of Queen Mother
and that "while it is possible for ordinary girls to keep their
sexual history a secret,. . . it is virtually impossible for some-
one who is to become a Queen Mother."'62 Finally, she pre-
sented her belief that if Abankwah is in fact not a virgin, "she
will be forced to undergo FGM as a form of punishment."16
157 Statutory Declaration by Kwabena Danso Otumfuor (Sept. 8, 1997),
Abankwah Joint Appendix at 244-45, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4304).
' Abankwah Joint Appendix at 4-5, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4304).
19 Affidavit of Victoria Otumfuor (Aug. 30, 1997), Abankwah Joint Appendix at




1 Id. at 248. In her oral testimony, Otumfuor essentially elaborates on the
statements contained in her affidavit, providing some of the bases of her knowl-
edge. For example, she discusses how years ago, prior even to her own birth, her
father had to flee his village because he refused to become king in his village and
that the punishment for such refusal would be equivalent in degree to that of
refusing to become a village queen mother. Abankwah Joint Appendix at 205-06,
Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304). Ms. Otumfuor also
stated that she met Abankwah in Ghana and later learned of her efforts to seek
asylum in the United States through her son, Kwabena Danso Otumfuor, who
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The Board was not persuaded by Victoria Otumfuor's affidavit
or her testimony, focusing on her statement that she did " 'not
know a great deal about [Abankwah's] tribe.' "" The Board
was also concerned that Victoria Otumfuor could not state
unequivocally that she knew whether Abankwah's tribe prac-
ticed FGM as a form of punishment.
16 5
Finally, the Board gave two reasons for why it did not find
Abankwah's documentary evidence persuasive. First, it found
that none of the documentation specifically named Abankwah's
tribe as one that practices FGM. Second, the Board found no
indication "that FGM is used as punishment or in retaliation
for failure to maintain chastity prior to marriage."' 6 The
Board reiterated some of the reasons for imposing FGM listed
in the documentary evidence: "pre-condition for marriage; test
for virginity; check against infidelity."'67 Ironically, the Board
does not seem to recognize the relationship of these cited rea-
sons to Abankwah's own claim that she would be forced to
undergo FGM precisely for having violated taboos of her own
community's culture and social mores.
The Second Circuit framed its analysis as a simple matter
of the sufficiency of the evidence. Nevertheless, the court fo-
cused on the nature of the harm inflicted by FGM and the
egregious and potentially life-threatening consequences of
undergoing that practice.16 The court characterized the rul-
ing by the IJ as twofold. First, the IJ was not convinced that
"[Abankwah's] fear of FGM as punishment for her lack of vir-
provided the declaration discussed supra at note 158 and accompanying text.
Abankwah Joint Appendix at 199, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999)
(No. 98-4304).
The record refers to her son as "Corvina" but this clearly seems to be an
error in the transcription from the tape recording of the hearing as his name is
spelled out Kwabena and there are no other individuals referred to in the record
with the last name of Otumfuor. See generally id.
1' Abankwah Joint Appendix at 5, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4304) (citations to the record omitted).
" Id. The Board quotes her as saying, "No, really, I can't say I know it specif-
ically." Id. (citations to record omitted).
1" Id.
"' Id. (citations omitted).
This approach follows that of Abankwah's counsel in his circuit court brief.
See generally Brief for Petitioner Abankwah in Support of Petition to Review to




ginity was objectively reasonable." Second, the IJ found that
Abankwah "failed to demonstrate that she feared any harm
that would be imposed on account of a statutorily protected
ground" determining instead that her fear was based on a
"personal problem."169 The court further found that the Board
did not dismiss Abankwah's claim for failure to establish a
nexus between her fear of persecution and one of the five stat-
utory grounds or show that her fear was objectively reason-
able. Rather, according to the court, the Board ruled that
Abankwah failed to establish "past persecution, and that the
'evidence [was] insufficient to support her claims of persecution
based upon her membership in a social group.' "170 The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the Board, holding that "Abankwah did
present sufficient evidence to support her claims and the re-
cord compels a finding that Abankwah's fear of persecution is
objectively reasonable."
The Abankwah court stated that the "substantial evidence"
test is one that "accords 'substantial deference' to the [Board's]
findings of fact" and that the "scope of review is 'exceedingly
narrow,' " allowing findings to be overturned "only if 'no rea-
sonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite fear of perse-
cution.' "172 The Court unequivocally concluded that "[ulnder
this standard, the [Board's] decision denying Abankwah asy-
lum cannot be sustained."73
Clearly, the Second Circuit was moved by the evidence
that detailed the potentially devastating consequences of FGM.
Relying on the evidence, the court briefly described the prac-
tice of FGM and referred to the 1996 Board decision granting
asylum to a young woman from Togo who had fled forcible
imposition of FGM.174 The court discussed the international
recognition of the practice of FGM as a "violation of women's
and female children's rights,"' and mentioned that this
practice "has also been criminalized under [U.S.] federal
169 Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 21.
17 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
171 Id. (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted).
'73 Id. at 23.
17" Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 23 (citing In re Fauziya Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278
(BIA June 13, 1996) (additional citations omitted).
" Id. (citations omitted).
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law.""' The Second Circuit reaffirmed what both the IJ and
the Board acknowledged: Abankwah's fear was subjectively
genuine. Regarding the objective basis of Abankwah's fear, the
court found that "[tihe [Board] was too exacting both in the
quantity and quality of evidence that it required.""'"
The Second Circuit summarized Abankwah's testimony,
which both the IJ and the Board deemed credible, and made
several important findings based on those facts. First, the
court found that FGM is used as a punishment for women of
Abankwah's tribe who break the taboo of pre-marital sex. Sec-
ond, the court found that as the next Queen Mother of her
tribe, it was especially important that Abankwah observed all
the tribal laws and customs. Next, the court noted that if
Abankwah had engaged in pre-marital sex, that fact would be
revealed during her enstoolment as Queen Mother. Finally, the
court concluded that the Ghanaian government neither could,
nor would, prevent Abankwah's tribe from subjecting her to
FGM."'8 Based on this rendition of Abankwah's testimony,
the court not only found her testimony credible and convincing,
but it also found that she had amply supported it with both
documentary and testimonial evidence."'9 Although the court
did not seem to give much weight to the declaration of
Kwabena Danso Otumfuor, it did discuss at some length the
testimony of Victoria Otumfuor.
The Second Circuit seemed particularly persuaded by the
evidence concerning the practice of FGM and its potentially
devastating consequences. The Court referred to a 1997 U.S.
Department of State Report on FGM in Ghana, specifically
noting the report's estimate that "between 15 and 30 percent of
all women and girls in Ghana had been subjected to FGM."
Relying on this figure, as well as other documentary evidence
concerning the practice of FGM in Ghana, the court deter-
mined that "Abankwah's position is particularly compelling in
-7 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 116 (Supp. 1996)).
17 Id. at 24.
178 Id.
. Though it did not rely on it, the Court referred to the legal standard that
an asylum applicant's uncorroborated testimony could be sufficient to sustain her
burden where that testimony is credible, consistent and specific. Abankwah, 185
F.3d at 24 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b) (1999); Melendez v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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light of the general conditions present in Ghana."'
In finding Abankwah's fear "sufficiently 'grounded in
reality' to satisfy the objective element of the test for well-
founded fear of persecution," 8' the Second Circuit made an
insightful, if somewhat understated, observation about the
proper approach to assessing the reasonableness of an asylum
applicant's fear.1 2 The court found that such assessment "
'may be tempered by individual considerations such as... the
experiential, educational, and cultural factors particular to the
individual respondent.' "183 This contextualized approach cap-
tures important gender dimensions to assessing credibility and
to conceptualizing persecution. Moreover, it reaffirms that
evidentiary assessments in asylum claims must be made in the
context in which the claim arose. By employing this approach,
the Abankwah court demonstrated a willingness to reach be-
yond narrow conceptions of harm and to interpret the degree of
proof necessary to substantiate an asylum claim when the
feared harm falls outside traditional asylum law notions of
persecution using a contextualized framework.' The Second
"s Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 24.
181 Id.
' Id. at 25 n.3.
1 Id. (citing In re Y-B-, Int. Dec. 337 (BIA Feb. 19, 1998). This is much the
same approach taken by the Board in Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996). Follow-
ing this approach, the circuit court criticized the INS for seeming "to suggest that
in order to demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear, Abankwah had to make
some formulaic statement that she knew she would be subjected to FGM because
someone, (in this case her grandmother), told her that it is the Nkumssa custom
to mutilate women who engage in sex before marriage." Id. Similarly, credibility
issues were raised in Kasinga because she was uncertain as to whether she had
married the man who would force her to undergo FGM since the ceremony had
not been completed, and because she was uncertain who precisely would perform
FGM on her. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 at 2. The INS argued that these were dis-
crepancies that made her appear not credible. Id. The Board rejected this argu-
ment, finding that these were explainable gaps in her knowledge or understanding
of the situation given her age, her upbringing, and the incomplete marriage cere-
mony, and found that her credibility was not undermined by these statements. Id.
at 3. For a detailed analysis of the Kasinga decision, see generally Karen Musalo,
In Re Kasinga: A Big Step Forward for Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 853 (July 1, 1996).
18 This was, conceivably, influenced by the manner in which the Board wrote
its decision as well as the manner in which Abankwah's counsel presented the
arguments to the circuit court. See generally Brief for Petitioner Abankwah in
Support of Petition to Review, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No.
98-4304). In the brief, counsel sets forth the argument as a question of sufficiency
of the evidence. Id. at 2. He then immediately addresses the harmful, often debili-
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Circuit assessed Abankwah's claim by seeking to understand it
based on the totality of her circumstances as a woman from a
culture and community that is highly gender-stratified. The
court then evaluated the harm she feared and the evidence she
submitted in support of her fear, both its quantity and quality,
in light of that complex context. This approach is quite differ-
ent from that taken in Gomez eight years earlier. Unfortunate-
ly, it is also vastly different from the approach taken by the
court only a few weeks later in Melgar. In both Gomez and
Melgar, the gendered harm-rape-was treated dismissively,
with the Second Circuit affirming the denial of each asylum
claim. Contrasting Abankwah with Gomez and Melgar surfaces
important issues relating to culture and gender. Thus, a con-
cluding comparative exploration of the three cases may be
useful for the development of gender issues in U.S. asylum
law.
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOMEZ, ABANKWAH, AND
MELGAR
Further exploration of the Second Circuit decisions in
Gomez, Abankwah, and Melgar reveals significant similarities
and differences. These comparisons arise in two basic arenas:
the factual basis of the claim and the application of the law to
those facts. Within the basic framework, there are a number of
variables, such as the country of origin and its social, political,
and cultural climate, the nature of the harm and the persecu-
tor, and the evidence supporting the claim. Gomez and Melgar
were similar with regard to the nature of the harm they expe-
rienced and the country conditions surrounding the infliction of
that harm. On the other hand, the evidence submitted in sup-
port of the claims in Melgar and Abankwah was very similar.
In Abankwah and Gomez, the past or future persecutors were
non-state actors. Significantly, in Abankwah, the facts, the
surrounding country conditions, and the court's analytical
tating and shocking nature of FGM. Id. at 3. Without defending the practice of
FGM, this approach has been criticized as allowing for too strenuous an indict-
ment of other cultures without conferring respect on the culture and context which
shape practices and rites. See, e.g., Isabelle R. Gunning, Women and Traditional
Practices: Female Genital Surgery, in KELLY D. ASKIN & DOREAN M. KOENIG EDS.,
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUzAN RIGHTS LAW vol. 1 at 651 (1999).
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approach in assessing the claim were markedly different from
both Gomez and Melgar.
The claims in both Gomez and Melgar were situated in the
context of the civil war in El Salvador, at opposite ends of the
time line. In Melgar, the persecution occurred in the aftermath
of the signing of the 1992 Peace Accords; in Gomez, the claim
arose in the early years of the conflict. Although it was official-
ly denied throughout the war, it is now widely accepted that
the United States played a significant role in the conflict in El
Salvador by providing funding and training to the military
dictatorship and even to death squad members." It is also
commonly believed that, for many years, U.S. foreign policy
considerations interfered with a fair and impartial adjudica-
tory process for asylum claims, particularly those claims
brought by people from El Salvador.'86 In light of this history
and controversy, it is not difficult to imagine that an asylum
seeker from El Salvador might be treated with some hesita-
tion, if not suspicion.'87 Thus, the fact that both Gomez and
Melgar were from El Salvador might well have had some bear-
ing on the outcome of those cases. 8 In addition to the simi-
, See generally DANNER, supra note 56
.. See American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal.
1991); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text and infra note 189.
* See, e.g., infra note 189.
1 Aside from the potential foreign policy issue, there is also the geographical
issue. Central America in general and El Salvador in particular are in close prox-
imity to the U.S. border. Throughout the 1980s, when the greatest number of
Salvadorans and other Central Americans fled to the United States seeking asy-
lum, many of them made virtually the entire journey on foot. This proximity does
not necessarily detract from the "otherness" or "alienness" dimension of the man-
ner in which the United States has viewed Salvadorans. I use this terminology to
underscore the fact that U.S. immigration law has a highly racialized context that
is built, from its inception, on the notion that there is an "us" who will be wel-
comed in and a "them" who may be welcomed in when labor demands call for it
but who are otherwise viewed as separate and apart from who "we" as a country
are or should be made up of. This includes a long history of discriminatory treat-
ment of many different groups of immigrants from the 1852 Chinese Exclusion Act
to the Mexican Bracero Program to the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II up to the recent treatment of interdicting boats carrying Haitian
refugees fleeing the repressive Duvalier regime. For a discussion of the impact of
race and racial prejudice on U.S. immigration law, see generally Kevin R. Johnson,
Race, The Immigration Law, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" Into
the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (Fall 1998). For an interesting view of
the historical discriminatory treatment of different immigrant groups in this coun-
try, see generally Gabriel Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
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larity of place and context, in at least one significant respect,
Gomez and Melgar suffered similar harm.
The claims in both Gomez and Melgar involved multiple
rapes.189 Thus, a full assessment of each of their claims re-
quired an understanding of the rapes as a gendered form of
harm and as a crucial dimension to the claims. However, the
court did not demonstrate any in-depth comprehension of the
rapes in either case nor did it recognize their persecutory and
politicized nature.19 The Gomez court examined important
questions of statutory interpretation where gender-based harm
was presented as the basis of the asylum claim.'9 ' In this
early decision, rendered before an international human rights
and refugee law foundation had been established to examine
these issues, the court concluded that Gomez did not demon-
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But Unexceptional Constitutional Immigra-
tion Law, 14 GEO. IMIOIGR. L.J. 257 (Winter 2000).
The perception of "otherness" and proximity, the U.S. support of the military
regime in El Salvador, and the numbers of Salvadoran refugees crossing the bor-
der from Mexico into the United States all worked together to create the prevail-
ing view that if one Salvadoran is granted asylum, many more-too many
more-will make the journey. In turn, it will become increasingly difficult to deny
them the same protection. In fact, during the height of the war in El Salvador,
according to one estimate, some 500,000 Salvadorans entered the United States,
largely through the southwestern border with Mexico in Texas, Arizona, and Cali-
fornia. See Temporary Suspension of Deportation for Nationals of Certain Countries:
Hearings on H.R. 822 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Inter-
national Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1985)
(statement of Rep. Moakley). Of that number, some three percent were granted
asylum protection between the years of 1987 and 1993. See 136 CONG. REc.
S17,108 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statistic cited by Sen. DeConcini). As for the
dilemma of justifying providing protection to some and not others, over the years
there have been a variety of short-term remedies designed to allow Salvadorans to
remain in the United States, culminating with the 1996 Nicaraguan and Cuban
Adjustment Relief Act (the "NACARA"). For further discussion on the treatment of
Salvadorans in the U.S. asylum law process, see generally Orantes-Hernandez v.
Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (D.C. Cal. 1988), affd 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990); Ari
Weitzhandler, Temporary Protected Status: The Congressional Response to the
Plight of Salvadoran Aliens, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 249 (1993).
189 As discussed above, in Melgar the rape was treated almost as a subsidiary
to her claim while in Gomez the repeated rapes over a two-year period formed the
substance of her claim. It is also true that Gomez' attackers were members of the
armed opposition while Melgar's were members of the Salvadoran armed forces.
This difference would not necessarily materially affect the potential prejudice
against granting asylum to Salvadorans.
19' The clear exception to this charge is Judge Kearse's dissent in Melgar. See
supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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strate that she was a member of a particular social group
based on her gender and, therefore, that she did not suffer per-
secution based on any group membership.
By the time Melgar was decided, gender-based harm had
achieved international recognition under human rights law
and was recognized as persecution in the context of refugee
and asylum law. Unlike the Gomez court, the Melgar court had
the opportunity to apply the most recent developments that led
to a recognition of rape, in particular, as a violation of human
rights and humanitarian law. The heart of the legal issue in
Melgar, however, was not interpretation of the meaning of
persecution, social group, or political opinion, as it had been in
Gomez. Rather, the Melgar court very explicitly identified as
the core issue the question of whether the Board's decision was
supported by substantial evidence.192 In considering this legal
question, the Melgar court also had the benefit of the reason-
ing in Abankwah, rendered only weeks before, which focused
quite specifically on the sufficiency of the evidence as the basis
of its ruling. Notwithstanding these significant developments,
the Melgar court held that the Board's decision denying the
claim was supported by substantial evidence, without seeming
to take into account any of the recent developments that argu-
ably could have had a profound impact on the court's approach,
if not its ultimate conclusion.'93
By contrast, the Abankwah court found that the Board's
decision denying the request for asylum was not supported by
substantial evidence.'94 Interestingly, a comparison of the re-
cords in Abankwah and Melgar reveal a number of similarities
regarding the quantum of the evidence submitted.
1" It was only the dissent that called into question the interpretation and ap-
plication by both the Board and the IJ of the well-founded fear standard.
Melgar, 191 F.3d at 313-24. The court ruled that the evidence supported the
findings below that neither the murder of her uncle nor the rape she and other
family members endured demonstrated "an objective basis that she will be perse-
cuted on account of a protected ground." Id. at 313. The court also ruled that
even assuming her uncle had been killed by the military for his support of the
guerrillas, "Melgar fails to offer any evidence upon which a reasonable person
could rest a well-founded fear of persecution due to her uncle's acts." Id. This
finding fails to recognize the link between the familial relationship between Melgar
and her uncle and the harm that could come to pass as a result of that close
family tie. It also completely disregards the persecution she did in fact endure just
weeks after her uncle's murder. Id.
.. Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 23.
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In support of her request for asylum, Abankwah submitted
one affidavit and one declaration. Although both documents
addressed her claim in particular, neither document was with-
out problem. The declaration came from a personal friend who
seemed to do little more than repeat what Abankwah had told
him about her story. 9 ' The affidavit came from a Ghanaian
woman, Victoria Otumfuor, who had lived for the past twenty
years in the United States and traveled regularly to Gha-
na. 9  This expert did have some independent knowledge
about practices and customs in Ghana, but she also stated
unequivocally that she had no knowledge about the Nkumssa
tribe or about the practice of FGM in that tribe. Thus, while
Victoria Otumfuor did display some knowledge about Ghana-
ian cultural practices, her main credentials seem to be that she
grew up in Ghana and maintained contact with the coun-
try.197 In contrast, Melgar provided an expert affidavit on hu-
man rights and country conditions in El Salvador following the
signing of the 1992 Peace Accords. Although it was not pre-
pared specifically for Melgar's case, the affidavit did provide a
comprehensive description of conditions in El Salvador at the
time Melgar's claim arose, including detailed information con-
cerning significant and on-going human rights violations in the
aftermath of the 1992 Peace Accords.' Arguably, the affi-
davit submitted in Melgar was at least as credible and provid-
ed as much support to her claim as the affidavit submitted in
Abankwah.'99 Certainly, the supporting oral and written tes-
... Declaration of Kwabena Danso Otumfuor, Abankwah Joint Appendix at 244-
46, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304).
" Affidavit of Victoria Otumfuo, Abankwah Joint Appendix at 247-49,
Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4304). Victoria Otumfuor
also testified at the hearing, essentially restating the content of her affidavit. See
Abankwah Joint Appendix at 199-221, Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-4304).
1' She might very well have further qualifications for her expertise but this is
not apparent from the record. Even the more anecdotal basis of her knowledge
was not fully developed in the record. See id.
1. For a discussion of some of the other documentary evidence submitted, see
supra note 123.
' See Affidavit of Terry Karl, Melgar Joint Appendix at 155-74, Melgar de
Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4124). It has not escaped this
author's notice that the "expert" in Abankwah is an African woman without what
many in the West would view as traditional credentials for her expertise. Melgar's
expert, on the other hand, is in fact college educated with numerous publications
and other credentials detailed in her affidavit, including Senior Fellow for the
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timony in Abankwah deserved to be assessed and relied on
appropriately. But it does not appear that the evidence was
more compelling than the similar type offered in Melgar.
Like Abankwah, Melgar also had a witness testify in sup-
port of her claim. Unlike the witness for Abankwah, however,
Melgar did not try to establish her witness as an expert. In
fact, it was her husband who was able to corroborate certain
aspects of her claim and who had himself received asylum
protection in the United States some years earlier.2"
Whereas Abankwah's witness testified about country condi-
tions to support her claim, Melgar's witness gave testimony as
to his personal knowledge of the basis of her claim.
In each of these cases, the Second Circuit looked to the
documentary evidence in addition to the testimony and written
support of witnesses and experts.0 1 In Abankwah, the docu-
mentary evidence that addressed the practice of FGM seemed
to have a particular impact on the court. Indeed, the court
relied on this evidence, even though there was little support
for Abankwah's claim that FGM was practiced by her tribe as
punishment for failure to comply with social taboos and restric-
tions imposed on the tribe's women."2
In contrast, Melgar did not include any evidence that spe-
cifically detailed the use of rape as a political or repressive tool
in El Salvador. Yet the documentary evidence, as well as the
expert affidavit, clearly provided a solid basis to support a
finding that the murder of her uncle and the subsequent rapes
of Melgar and her family members were politically motivated.
The failure of the Melgar court to find links between the polit-
ical activities of Melgar and her uncle, her uncle's murder, and
Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. See id. at 155. Certainly
there are cultural biases in how an individual's expertise is measured and valued.
It also bears repeating that in this particular comparison, it was Abankwah whose
witness the Court seemed to find compelling while in Melgar the expert affidavit
was scarcely even mentioned.
200 Specifically, he was able to discuss his involvement in the water project that
he believed would subject her to persecution if she were forced to return. Melgar
Joint Appendix at 102-05, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999)
(No. 98-4124). He also corroborated her testimony about the woman who supposed-
ly was going to help her obtain a visa to depart El Salvador and instead
threatened to turn her over to the military authorities. Id. at 100-01.
20' The documentary evidence submitted in Melgar and Abankwah is discussed
in detail in supra Part IV.
202 Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 26.
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the subsequent rape and assault against Melgar, reveals the
court's profound lack of awareness of the gendered and politi-
cal nature of rape. The Melgar court, with the clear exception
of the Kearse dissent, seemed disturbingly unable to frame
Melgar's asylum claim in a broader, more gender-aware, con-
text.
It may be that a sense of "otherness" of the two women
and their circumstances played a role in shaping the Second
Circuit's approach to these cases. The notion of woman as
"other" and, as a result, not having a place in the mainstream,
is common in many critiques of traditional law and analy-
sis."3 These critiques address the ways in which women's
concerns have been dismissed because they are not valued the
same as those faced or experienced by men.
Applying this critical approach to the decision in Melgar
provides insight into what might have led the court to be so
dismissive of the egregious and politicized nature of the rapes
that Melgar and her family members experienced. At the same
time, rape is such a common occurrence in the United States
and throughout the world that the urge to keep it removed
from human rights and persecution analysis, though not ac-
ceptable, could be considered predictable. The court's unwill-
ingness to find both the political and persecutory nature of the
treatment of Melgar and her family members is thus not sur-
prising, but is deeply disappointing. A similar argument,
though perhaps less compelling in light of the time at which
the decision was rendered, could be made about the Gomez
court's approach.
Unlike both Melgar and Gomez, however, Abankwah pre-
sented a different kind of "otherness.""4 Abankwah fled
" See generally WINNIE HAzOU, THE SOCIAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); WOMEN AND CULTURE (Caroline Sweetman ed., 1995).
"" This factor did not favorably influence the Board or the IJ, both of which
denied her claim. Both found a basis for distinguishing this claim from the claim
in Kasinga, in which the Board ruled that FGM constitutes a form of persecution;
that those seeking to carry out the FGM need not have a punitive intent for it to
constitute persecution; and that in this particular case, Kasinga had established
her membership in a particular social group of young women in the Kunsuntu
Tschamba tribe of Togo who had not undergone FGM and who were subject to it
and that she would face persecution on account of this group membership. In re
Fauziya Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996). This decision was rendered following
much publicity and a long period of detention for Kasinga. The INS did not seek
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strange and exotic customs and practices in faraway Ghana.
Perhaps, on some level, these factors contributed to the Second
Circuit's conclusion in Abankwah that, based on the evidence
submitted, no reasonable fact-finder could have found
Abankwah ineligible for asylum. Unlike rape, FGM is per-
ceived as a cultural practice performed in distant countries and
is often viewed with contempt and even outrage by many in
the United States.0 5 It has been widely condemned as being
a most egregious violation of the fundamental right to bodily
integrity."6 The "exotic" and shocking nature of the practice
of FGM may have allowed the Abankwah court to look at the
claim more holistically and to recognize FGM as gender-based
persecution.0 7 Examining the facts in that framework, in
turn, allowed the court to conclude that the claim was support-
ed by substantial evidence and that the Board erred as a mat-
ter of law in denying asylum to Abankwah. The essential ana-
lytical determinant in reaching this outcome is found here in
the Abankwah court's broad, contextual approach to the claim.
review in the circuit court of the Board's final decision, which was rendered en
banc and, though not unanimous, contained only a single line dissent by one
Board Member. Id. at 20.
201 In fact, this concern that FGM was being practiced in the United States led
to the passage of the Anti-Female Genital Mutilation Legislation, 18 U.S.C. § 116
(Supp. 1996).
20 While the practice of FGM may raise deep questions pertaining to cultural
relativism and universalism in human rights discourse, it is beyond the scope of
this article to closely examine these important issues. For purposes here, it suffic-
es to say that, again, while it is impossible to have any degree of certainty re-
garding the degree of influence this aspect of the case may have had, it is also
difficult to discount the possibility that it did play some role in the outcome of the
case. Others have written about how the practice of FGM has been viewed in this
country. For one of the first, and most eloquent articles grappling with this issue
in the legal context, see generally Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-
Traveling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries 23
CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (1991). See generally Phoebe A. Haddon, All the
Difference in the World: Listening and Hearing the Voices of Women 8 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 377 (1999).
207 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995); BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM (1995); PATRICIA WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. For
an insightful discussion of racism and affirmative action from the point of view of
a white scholar raising an African-American daughter, see generally Sharon Eliza-
beth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1999).
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It is the court's application of this analytical framework that
most distinguishes Abankwah from Melgar and Gomez. °
Abankwah presents yet another key distinction-race.
Certainly, there is the significance of "other" in race. In the
United States, where racism permeates many social, cultural,
and political institutions, there is often a strong social bias in
favor of appearing "white" or Caucasian.0 9 Ironically, that bi-
as seems to be working inversely in Abankwah. The fact that
Abankwah is black-skinned becomes part of her more exotic
"otherness." Her race redounds negatively not so much against
her, but against where she comes from and what she fears. In
this context, the race of the people she feared harm from may
have helped support her claim rather than weaken it.
CONCLUSION
Great advances have been made in international human
rights law in the recognition of violence perpetrated against
women as human rights violations. Rape has achieved recogni-
tion as a crime of war and a tool of repression. A variety of
courts, including the Second Circuit, are taking a more nu-
anced approach to claims that raise gender-based persecution.
... The discussion of the factors that might have negatively influenced the out-
come of these three decisions is not meant to suggest that the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals renders its decisions in asylum claims based on foreign policy
considerations, proximity of the country of flight, racial stereotypes, or any other
inappropriate factor. At the same time, asylum claims require, by their nature,
examining such factors as race, country conditions and, at times, relations with
other countries, the nature and type of harm feared, and other factors that,
viewed in isolation or to an extreme, might easily slide into misconceptions at
best. In the context of evaluating an asylum claim, any or all of these factors may
be relevant to attaining a clear understanding of the issues and analyzing them
completely in all their complexity. It is the kind of examination provided, and the
depth of acknowledgment and understanding in addressing the issues, that is
being questioned here.
" A full exploration of race and racism in this country is far beyond the scope
of this article. The implications of racism, sexism, and other biases and prejudices
intertwine in very different ways in the context of examining a claim for asylum.
There is no basis to conclude that one claim was granted based solely on the
applicant's race or the nature of the harm feared or that another claim was de-
nied for these same reasons. At the same time, an asylum applicant's gender,
race, and nature of the harm feared or experienced are all factors that generally
come into play in making and assessing an asylum claim. The potential of any or




The Gomez decision reflects a long out-dated view of these
issues. The Melgar decision reveals the best and the worst of
the Second Circuit's ability and willingness to adequately and
appropriately assess gender issues in the human rights and
asylum law context. Judge Kearse's dissent in Melgar reflects
a sophisticated and elegant contextual analysis-one that fully
and inherently integrates issues of culture, gender, and society,
and represents the high-water mark of analysis of gender-
based persecution by the Second Circuit. The court may not yet
be prepared to incorporate this approach on a broad scale in its
assessment of asylum claims. The Abankwah decision offers an
important alternative to the Kearse dissent in Melgar. In
Abankwah, the court consciously surfaced gender and applied a
contextualized framework of analysis. A thoughtful and con-
sistent application of this analytical approach is necessary for
the Second Circuit to render fair and just decisions on asylum
claims raising gender issues, and perhaps to one day set the
standard for providing an inherently gendered and
contextualized analysis of all asylum claims.
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